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ABSTRACT 
This thesis describes a multi-faceted evaluation of the U.S. Naval Aviation Crew 
Resource Management (CRM) program. CRM training is used to instruct naval aviators 
in safety critical, non-technical behaviors. Reactions were evaluated by using a single 
item from command safety climate questionnaires (n=51, 570 observations over nine 
years). Attitudes were assessed using a 37-item survey (364 responses). Knowledge was 
evaluated using a 10-item multiple-choice test (123 responses). Finally, the causes of 
naval aviation mishaps from fiscal years 1997-2007 (238 mishaps) were examined to 
identify how many were attributed to failings related to CRM concepts. It was found that 
aviators perceived CRM training to be useful, had positive attitudes towards concepts 
addressed in the training, and the level of knowledge was constant across rank and 
aircraft type. Nevertheless, human error still accounts for more than 80% of all mishaps 
in naval aviation, and over 65% of those are attributed to at least one failure in CRM. As 
human error continues to plague naval aviation, routine evaluations of CRM’s 
effectiveness are critical to ensure it is achieving its goal to “improve mission 
effectiveness by minimizing crew preventable errors, maximizing crew coordination, and 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Human error is attributed as a causal factor in more than 80% of all mishaps in 
Naval aviation (Naval Safety Center, 2006). The Naval Aviation Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) Training Program was initiated by the Naval Safety Center in 1989 
to reduce the number of aviation mishaps by minimizing the number of human 
performance-related errors (Alkov, 1989). CRM seeks to employ all available resources 
including human, informational and equipment to maximize performance while ensuring 
mission safety (Federal Aviation Administration, 2004). In 1991, the Department of the 
Navy officially adopted the practice of routinely administering CRM training to all 
aeronautically designated personnel (Chief of Naval Operations, 2001). Despite the 
numerous advancements over the last two decades in aircraft system design, minimal 
changes have been made to the Navy’s CRM training program. Since the majority of 
CRM evaluations were performed over a decade ago, a need existed for additional 
research into the effectiveness of the current Naval CRM program. This thesis provides a 
thorough analysis of the Navy’s CRM program, seeking to determine if the training 
continues to accomplish its designed objective of improving safety and crew 
performance.  
The goal of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the Naval CRM 
training program using a multi-faceted assessment across different aviation platforms 
(Navy and Marine Corps). In addition, this evaluation considers the Human Systems 
Integration (HSI) approach to CRM by addressing human factors, safety, as well as 
manpower, personnel, training and education (MPT&E) strategies related to competency 
management and development within each aviation community.  Kirkpatrick’s (1976) 
hierarchy of training evaluation technique was applied to examine three levels of training 
assessment including: participant reactions, amount of learning received, and impact on 
the Navy as an organization (in terms of mishaps).  
Reactions.  Naval aviators CRM reaction responses indicated on command safety 
climate surveys were extracted from the Navy’s Command Safety Assessment Survey 
(CSAS) from fiscal years 2000-2008. Over 50,000 responses were analyzed in terms of 
 xvi
the perceived utility of Naval CRM training. The results suggest that aviators continue to 
be favorable about CRM training and perceive it as “useful.”  
Learning. Attitudes and knowledge assessments were distributed to naval aviators 
to examine effects of learning with respect to non-technical concepts taught in CRM 
training. A Naval Aviator Human Factors (NAHF) questionnaire was developed and 
administered to 364 aviation officers investigating attitudes towards CRM concepts. 
Attitudes of naval aviators were generally positive, indicating acceptance of the CRM 
program. To further assess learning, a Knowledge Assessment for Naval Aviation CRM 
(KANCRM) was created and disseminated to 100 aviators to analyze differences between 
types of aviators in understanding CRM techniques. Despite lower than expected scores, 
no significant differences were observed between aviators varying in rank and airframe 
experience.   
Results. The organizational impact of CRM was evaluated by examining aviation 
mishaps from 1997 to 2007. It was found that mishap rates have remained fairly 
consistent over the past several decades. The percentage of reported mishaps as a result 
of human error or CRM failure has remained over 65%. These findings suggest human 
error still plagues naval aviation despite the indicated cultural acceptance of CRM from 
the reactions and attitudes of naval aviators.   
In conclusion, the results may imply that further reduction of human error in 
aviation has asymptotically reached a limit. Human error may very well be inevitable 
(Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). Due to the complexity and number of factors 
involved in aviation mishaps, estimating the success of CRM may be too challenging. 
The possibility exists that CRM is maintaining already low mishap rates and preventing 
them from rising to their previously elevated levels. Nonetheless, the findings of this 
evaluation have implications for human factors issues addressed in CRM training and 
highlight potential areas for future improvement of the Naval Aviation CRM program. 
Continuous assessment of Naval CRM training is essential in measuring the vitality of 
the program and whether it is meeting its goal in aviation of “improving mission 
effectiveness by minimizing crew preventable errors, maximizing crew coordination, and 
optimizing risk management” (Chief of Naval Operations, 2001). 
 xvii
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. HUMAN ERROR IN AVIATION 
Concern for safety has remained a high visibility issue in both commercial and 
military aviation. A shift has already occurred; pinpointing the preponderance of aviation 
mishaps as a result of human factors errors vice mechanical systems. Research has shown 
that the number of accidents in aircraft due to mechanical or environmental problems has 
drastically dropped in the last several decades. For example, in 1977 a study of naval 
aviation revealed the proportion of accidents related to mechanical and environmental 
causes were practically equivalent to those linked to human error. By 1992, a follow on 
study showed that accidents solely caused by mechanical or environmental issues had 
been reduced to relatively insignificant amounts. While the second study acknowledged a 
decrease in both mechanical and human related error, the proportion of accidents directly 
attributed to failure of human factors had only dropped by 50% (Shappell & Wiegmann, 
1996). 
Over the past several decades, numerous technological developments in aircraft 
design have drastically improved safety, reducing the number of aviation related 
accidents. Nevertheless, human error still accounts for more than 80% of aviation 
mishaps (Wiegmann & Shappell, 1999). The challenge of reducing human error remains 
a vital concern in all high reliability organizations. Investigations into causes of accidents 
have revealed that the major contributors to aviation mishaps are frequently linked to 
some form of human error. As task complexity increases, human error becomes more 
prominent; especially when tasks are increasingly dependent on team interaction. Human 
factor causes of crashes in aviation have been commonly linked to a failure in 
interpersonal communication, crew coordination, decision making, situational awareness, 
and leadership (Flin, O'Connor, & Mearns, 2002). Considering the additional stress 
imposed on aviators during military flight operations, team processes and information 
sharing between crewmembers can become problematic. Therefore, it is important that 
crewmembers are trained properly for technical as well as interpersonal aptitudes. 
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Training in aviation has traditionally centered on technical skills and tasks. This is 
true for both commercial and military flight training. The philosophy remained persistent 
that aviators should concentrate on the essential technical skill of how to fly the aircraft.  
The idea of team cohesion and interaction amongst crewmembers took a proverbial 
backseat. The assumption was that non-technical skills required in aircrew coordination 
would naturally materialize without extensive and focused training.  Non-technical skills 
are comprised of cognitive, social, and personal resource skills used to complement 
traditional technical skills (Flin, O'Connor, & Crichton, 2008). These competencies have 
proven fundamental in operating in team related tasks such as flight crew management. 
Non-technical skills also contribute to the safety of a mission. Fortunately, in the past two 
decades, crewmember teamwork and coordination have begun to emerge as priorities. 
This precedence started in the commercial aviation sector and quickly migrated to 
military flight programs.  
In an attempt to combat the large number of mishaps in aviation related to human 
error, a training program was developed to provide training to aviation crew personnel on 
the non-technical skills required for safe operations. The program sought to develop 
competencies related to team coordination and communication in the cockpit. The 
training was originally called Cockpit Resource Management, but now it has adapted and 
is commonly referred to as Crew Resource Management (CRM). CRM was designed 
with the objective to reduce the number of cockpit mishaps by decreasing the number of 
human performance related errors (Alkov, 1989). The training has since emerged as a 
common method to teach interpersonal dynamics and team coordination skills (O'Connor, 
Hahn, & Nullmeyer, in press).  
B. NEED FOR EVALUATION 
Despite numerous technical advancements over the last two decades in aircraft 
system safety design, minimal changes have been made to the Navy’s CRM training 
program. Missions, personnel, and equipment have changed over the last ten years. 
Additionally, there is no guarantee that a training program will maintain its effectiveness 
over time, and thus must be evaluated frequently. In large organizations like the U.S. 
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Navy and U.S. Marine Corps it is challenge to establish consistency in any training 
program. Even with the large number of studies that previously assessed CRM 
effectiveness, the majority of the evaluation studies of the Naval CRM program were 
performed over a decade ago.  Since that time, there has been progress in human factors 
and training research (Flin et al., 2008). Therefore, there is a need for additional research 
evaluating the effectiveness of the Navy’s CRM program. A robust analysis helps 
determine if the training continues to accomplish its designed intention of improving 
safety and crew coordination in naval aviation. Applying methods and techniques used in 
previous CRM evaluation research, this thesis provided an updated evaluation of the 
Naval CRM program to fill important research gaps. An update review of CRM is 
important, as it provides insight on the vitality of the Navy’s program. Furthermore, this 
research assessed whether the program is still positively accepted by the U.S. Naval 
aviation community and provided recommendations on ways the effectiveness of the 
training can be enhanced. 
C. OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this research effort is to evaluate the effectiveness of the current 
Navy CRM training program across multiple aviation platforms. This in depth analysis 
presents valuable metrics as evidence of the practicality of the Navy’s current CRM 
program. In addition, this study investigated differences between types of Navy and 
Marine Corps aviators with respect to the implementation of CRM training. The specific 
goals of this effort include: 
 To analyze the reactions of naval aviators after receiving Crew Resource 
Management training, 
 to analyze the learning of naval aviators receive, in terms of attitude 
changes and knowledge retained, as a result of CRM training 
 to analyze the impact CRM training has on the naval aviation community 
in terms of improving safety.  
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Using a multifaceted evaluation technique in the present study allowed a number 
of questions regarding CRM effectiveness to be answered. Analyzing CRM on multiple 
levels is accomplished by investigating learner feedback as well as analyzing outcome 
metrics (reported safety data) across the Navy’s aviation community. Specifically, this 
study addressed the following questions: 
 What do aviators think about the Navy’s CRM training program? How 
have the reactions changed, if at all, over the last decade? 
 Are attitudes towards concepts addressed in CRM training different 
between junior and senior aviation personnel? Does experience affect the 
amount of knowledge retained from the program? 
 Are there variations in attitudes or knowledge amongst aviators who fly 
different airframes? 
 Has CRM impacted the safety mishap rate in naval aviation over the last 
decade?  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This study investigated the effectiveness of naval aviation CRM training applying 
a multi-level evaluation approach. Using Kirkpatrick’s (1976) hierarchy of evaluation, 
three levels of the training assessment topology was conducted looking at the reactions, 
the amount of learning received and organizational results of the Naval CRM program. 
The learning portion is divided into two separate analyses to examine aviators’ attitudes 
towards concepts taught in CRM and the requisite knowledge acquired from the training. 
Each method is briefly described below and is discussed in greater detail in the respective 
sections. 
1. Reaction Analysis 
First, reactions of naval aviators were examined using historical data provided 
from the Naval Safety Center. A database consisting of CRM reaction responses from 
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fiscal years 2000 to 2008 for over 50,000 naval aviators were analyzed. The effects of 
rank and airframe on reaction responses were investigated to determine perception of 
aviators concerning the utility of CRM training. 
2. Attitudinal Analysis 
An attitude questionnaire based upon the Cockpit Management Attitudes 
Questionnaire (CMAQ; Gregorich and Wilhelm, 1993) was distributed to U.S. Navy and 
Marine Corps aviators attending the Naval Aviation Schools Command. The responses 
from the questionnaire were analyzed to examine the attitudes towards the non-technical 
concepts addressed in CRM training. The effect of rank and airframe on attitude 
responses was investigated and analyzed. 
3. Knowledge Analysis 
Knowledge acquired from CRM training was analyzed by developing a 10 item, 
multiple-choice knowledge assessment. This assessment was distributed to fleet aviators 
attending the Naval Postgraduate School and Naval Aviation Safety School. The score 
results were collected and analyzed to gauge the level of knowledge from CRM training. 
Again, differences in rank and airframe were considered in the CRM knowledge 
assessment. 
4. Organizational Impact Analysis 
Naval Aviation Class A mishap data, from the Naval Safety Center, was 
examined from 1997 until 2007 to evaluate impact of CRM as a causal factor. Mishap 
data also was analyzed and compared to previous studies. Comparisons were made 
between rotary wing and tactical jet (TACAIR) aircraft. As human error continually is 
identified as a causal factor in many mishaps, an examination of human error contribution 
was investigated to determine the role of CRM concepts in aviation mishaps. 
F. HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 
In Naval aviation, system performance and flight safety are heavily reliant on 
successful aircrew coordination and communication. Therefore, Crew Resource 
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Management skills are an essential piece of HSI. Human Systems Integration (HSI) is an 
interdisciplinary approach that makes explicit the underlying tradeoffs in each of its 
domains, facilitating optimization of total system performance and reduced life cycle 
costs. The term Human Systems Integration is interpreted differently by various 
organizations. According to the Handbook of Human Systems Integration, HSI is a 
technical and managerial concept bringing together various disciplines with the goal of 
appropriately incorporating humans into the design, production, and operation of 
programs and systems (Booher, 2003). One of the main goals of the Navy’s HSI program 
includes improving human performance and safety in all operational systems. The 
Department of the Navy currently recognizes eight key domains of Human Systems 
Integration including: 
 Manpower – a term used to denote the number of human resources, 
including military and civilian, required and available to operate and 
maintain a system. 
 Personnel – the aptitudes, experiences, and other human characteristics 
necessary to achieve optimal system performance. The goal is to match the 
“right person” to the “right job.” 
 Training – acquisition of the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities 
needed by the available personnel to operate and maintain systems under 
various operational conditions. 
 Human Factors Engineering – the comprehensive integration of human 
characteristics into system definition, design, development, and evaluation 
to optimize the performance of human-machine combinations.  
 System Safety – the inherent ability of the system to be used, operated, 
and maintained without accident or injury to personnel. 
 Health Hazards – the inherent conditions in the operation or use of a 
system that can cause death, injury, illness, disability, or reduce job 
performance of personnel. 
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 Human Survivability –a system characteristic that allows personnel to 
exist and function during and following exposure to hostile environments 
or situations. Includes issues involving enemy and friendly combat 
weapons-induced injuries and the inherent hazards to personnel during 
threat/combat conditions, and the inherent hazards of military equipment 
 Habitability – the physical environment in which personnel are required to 
live, work, and sleep while performing their duties. This includes the 
physical and psychological needs of the individual and group, and takes 
into account morale and the social environment during both sustained and 
continuous military operations.  
An evaluation of the Navy’s CRM training program is specifically relevant to five 
HSI domains: Manpower, Personnel, Training, Human Factors, and System Safety. With 
respect to the domains of Manpower and Personnel, this study provided information on 
differences in the naval aviation workforce in terms of their acceptance towards CRM 
training. In addition, the knowledge, skills, and attitudes acquired as a result of the Naval 
CRM program were assessed. The outcomes of this study provide insight into selection 
criteria for crew team members across aviation platforms. This may help address future 
workforce challenges and speaks to Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education 
(MPTE) strategies for competency management. Additionally, this evaluation helps 
identify how CRM training might be implemented elsewhere in the Navy organization to 
teach aspects of human factors during operations. 
The HSI domains of human factors and system safety also are relevant to the 
study described in this paper. Analyzing CRM effectiveness has implications for aircraft 
system design. Just as mechanical improvements have reduced system errors and 
increased system safety, the CRM program aims to minimize the potential for human 
errors. Specifically, it seeks to reduce the crew coordination failures that lead to accidents 
and injuries. These errors can result from human to human interaction as well as human 
to machine misinterpretations. Another benefit of CRM training is that it provides a risk 
management and assessment tool for aviators and crew personnel. CRM has a direct 
impact on a team decision-making process. Optimizing risk management will ensure  
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system safety and limit preventable errors.  Finally, examining mishap rates in aviation 
over the past decade may reveal undiscovered trends in flight safety data directly 
accredited to the impact of CRM training.  
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
A brief literature review of the history and development of CRM training is 
discussed in Chapter II. This review encompasses a breakdown of the seven non-
technical skills taught in the Naval Crew Resource Management aviation program. 
Historical methods used to evaluate training effectiveness also are discussed in Chapter 
II. This thesis evaluated the effectiveness of the Naval CRM program using a 
multifaceted approach. The subsequent chapters are devoted to analyzing the CRM 
program on multiple levels.  Chapter III describes an analysis of the reactions of trainees 
to the CRM program. Chapters IV and V outline a method to gauge the level of learning 
received from Naval CRM. These two chapters are broken down into two respective 
learning assessments: attitudes and knowledge. Chapter VI is devoted to looking at the 
organizational impact CRM has had on naval aviation over the past decade.  This 
included an analysis of historical naval aviation safety mishap data. Chapter VII 
summarizes the results from each of the four distinct analyses and discusses future 
implications for the U.S. Navy. Additionally, a few recommendations are made for 
further research in evaluating and applying CRM concepts in other communities.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. HISTORY OF CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Concepts included in Crew Resource Management (CRM) can be traced back to 
human factors research conducted in military aviation during World War II.  During this 
period, highly reliable aircraft were being introduced and more failures were being 
acknowledged as operator oversight rather than mechanical defects (Davies, 2001). This 
recognition of crew error prompted extensive research directed at identifying various 
types of performance skills, unrelated to mechanical error, to ensure pilot and aircraft 
safety (NASA; Cooper, White, & Lauber, 1980). While CRM concepts and research may 
have started in the military, it was the civilian and commercial aviation industry that 
began to address the ‘human’ aspects of aviation. The CRM training program was first 
instituted and developed for civil air carriers. 
The definition of Crew Resource Management has taken several forms since its 
origination. Although a universal definition has not been reached, many agree that 
development of teamwork attitudes, personalities, and social interactions are at the center 
of CRM training. Others foresee CRM training as a method to foster proper crew 
behavioral skills (Wiener, Kanki, & Helreich, 1993). The term “behavioral skills” falls 
subject to a wide range of interpretation from program to program and, therefore, 
contributes to lack of agreement on what really defines CRM (Salas, Rhodenizer, & 
Bowers, 2000). It is easy to focus on the ‘crew’ aspect of CRM, but the ‘resource’ is 
equally imperative to the program’s success. In fact, the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) recognized that CRM training and applications must include all resources to 
achieve effective coordination. This includes people, equipment, cognitive processes, 
procedures and information.  The definition offered by the FAA (1989) states: 
CRM can be broadly defined as the utilization of all available human, 
informational, and equipment resources toward the goal of safe and 
efficient flight. CRM is an active process by crewmembers to identify 
significant threats, to communicate them, and to develop, communicate, 
and carry out a plan and actions to avoid or mitigate each threat. CRM 
also deals directly with the avoidance of human errors and the 
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management and mitigation of those errors that occur. CRM reflects the 
application of human factor knowledge to the special case of flight crews 
and their interactions with each other, with other groups and with the 
technology in the system (p. 2). 
Many still agree that CRM is a technique that ensures the proper utilization of all 
available resources to effectively achieve a desired outcome. Salas et al. (1999) further 
expound on the definition of CRM by describing it as “a set of instructional strategies 
designed to improve teamwork in the cockpit by applying well-tested tools (e.g., 
performance measurements, exercises, feedback mechanisms) and appropriate training 
methods (e.g., simulators, lectures, videos) targeted at specific content (i.e., teamwork 
knowledge, skills, and attitudes).”  These founding principles were the catalyst as CRM 
became quickly adopted throughout civilian and military aviation, including the Navy.  
1. Civilian and Commercial Origins 
CRM training programs originated in the United States starting with a workshop 
in 1979 sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA; 
Cooper et al., 1980). There was widespread trepidation concerning the large number of 
commercial aviation accidents attributed to “pilot error” (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 
1999). Failures in decision making, interpersonal communications and leadership were 
identified as some of the most common human errors linked to accidents in aviation. The 
objective of developing a resource management program was to train aviators on aspects 
of interpersonal communications, decision making, and leadership. The program quickly 
spread throughout many civilian aviation applications across the globe (Helmreich, et al., 
1999). At the program’s onset, it was referred to as Cockpit Resource Management. The 
term “Cockpit” was largely due to the fact that sources of human error develop from 
failures in coordination between pilots and their team members in the cockpit. The 
commercial airlines led the effort to establish the resource management program for a 
number of reasons. The recognition of a need was a result of the research conducted at 




aptitude (Lauber, 1987). Another basis for CRM training came from public concern over 
the increased frequency of fatal aircraft accidents in the 1970’s due to human error 
(Prince & Salas, 1993). 
The first generation of Cockpit Resource Management training started with a 
United Airlines program in 1981 (Helmreich, et al., 1999).  This training consisted of 
seminar-type forums looking at managerial issues and leadership concerns. Much of the 
attention was focused on problems dealing with the lack of assertiveness in subordinates 
and the potential dictatorial behavior of commercial airline captains (both of which have 
been identified as potential causal factors in crashes). Many of these modules highlighted 
the need for recurrent training, even for experienced pilots. In addition, simulators were 
beginning to be utilized to observe and practice CRM techniques. 
In 1986, NASA convened once again to discuss expanding the Cockpit Resource 
Management Program (Orlady & Foushee, 1987). This conference brought together many 
organizations throughout the world to discuss implementation of CRM type courses. At 
this time, the application of training began emphasizing the need to integrate more 
teamwork and coordination concepts.  This transformed the program from being referred 
to as “Cockpit” to “Crew” Resource Management. Additionally, the civilian airline 
industry had recognized the modular nature of aviation crews (Helmreich et al., 1999). 
Flight crews were being assembled on an ad hoc basis with little continuity. 
Recommended changes to the program included incorporation of flight attendants, 
dispatchers, and maintenance personnel. This set in motion joint cockpit and cabin CRM 
training. Also, checklists were being added by many of the airlines that included 
behavioral skills. These checklists re-emphasized the importance of teaching non-
technical skills to improve flight crew coordination and safety.  
It was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that the commercial aviation 
industry began upgrading CRM training to include recurrent classroom training in 
conjunction with performance assessments (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993). Shortly 
thereafter, CRM skills were starting to merge with existing technical instruction. 
Advanced training quickly emerged for check airmen and instructors with regards to 
CRM concepts (Helmreich et al., 1999). With so many different CRM related safety 
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programs surfacing in the commercial aviation sector, the FAA launched the Advanced 
Qualification Program (AQP). The FAA describes AQP as a “systematic methodology 
for developing the content of training programs for air carrier crewmembers and 
dispatchers” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2004). AQP is designed to focus flight 
training and evaluation on crew as well as individual performance. The goal of AQP was 
to decrease the likelihood of crew-related errors by encouraging innovative ways to 
improve modify known causes of human error. Further, it eradicates some previous 
regulatory barriers integrating CRM and technical training, and provides incentives to 
organizations to adopt collective programs (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993).  
Helmreich et al. (1999) estimated CRM had evolved into its fifth generation by 
the late 1990s. These subsequent generations are realizing that human error is inevitable. 
Because errors are certain, the more recent notion is that CRM can be implemented as a 
means to not only minimize the occurrences of human error, but incorporate a technique 
to identify error early and mitigate consequences of those errors (Flin et al., 2008). More 
recently, CRM is being reviewed and updated to ensure it is properly incorporated with 
today’s technology. Simulation and computer based programs both provide a unique 
medium for future CRM training. CRM concepts and applications are the most well 
known in commercial and military aviation; however, CRM concepts and programs 
continue to expand into all types of industries. Today CRM techniques are being applied 
and commonly used throughout many high reliability industries such as oil production 
platforms, nuclear energy, and numerous medical fields (see Flin, O’Connor, & Mearns, 
2002 for a review). 
2. Military Applications 
In the early days of CRM training, the military believed it to be a civilian-specific 
enterprise.  Leaders in the military may have initially overlooked the need for a crew 
training program like CRM because they already had methods in place to address 
coordination in the cockpit (Brown, 1987). These ranged from aircrew coordination 
checklists to briefings and lectures, but no formal training existed. As human error 
awareness grew in the civilian aviation community, the military’s view of human error 
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rapidly changed. As with commercial aviation, research of military aviation mishaps 
showed that human-related failures were being identified as the main causal factor 
(Leedom, 1990).  In addition to saving lives and retraining personnel, avoiding accidents 
helps save millions of dollars in aircraft replacement. The U.S. military services started 
their own version of CRM training in the late 1980s and early 1990s and these are 
discussed briefly below. 
United States Air Force. The U.S. Air Force was one of the first services to 
implement its own form of CRM training in the mid 1980’s within its Military Airlift 
Command, now known as Air Mobility Command (MAC). The Air Force Inspection and 
Safety Center subsequently developed a CRM type course in 1990 for all single seat 
fighters (O'Connor, Hahn, & Nullmeyer, in press). The course was originally labeled 
“Aircrew Coordination Training,” or ACT. Currently, CRM training is mandated for all 
Air Force crewmembers.  In the Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-290, it states the goals of 
the Air Force’s CRM program are to maximize operational effectiveness and combat 
capability while preserving personnel and material resources (Secretary of the Air Force, 
1995). 
United States Army.  The Army introduced the first service-wide, standardized 
CRM training program in the early 1990s, also known as ACT.  The U.S. Army defines 
the aircrew coordination as “a set of principles, attitudes, procedures, and techniques that 
transforms individuals into an effective crew” (Katz & Grubb, 2003). The U.S. Army 
Aviation Center (USAAVNC), the Army Research Institute (ARI), and the U.S. Army 
Safety Center (USASC) conducted a number of studies researching crew-level 
performance to develop a training program that would enhance team aircrew 
coordination. Since that time, the Army has updated its program by implementing the 
ACT-E (Aircrew Coordination Training – Enhanced) program in 2006. Currently, all 
army aviators are given initial ACT-E training with annual refreshers (O'Connor, Hahn, 
& Nullmeyer, in press).   
United States Navy and Marine Corps. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps also 
demonstrated interest in improving aircrew coordination and began developing its own 
Crew Resource Management program in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  In 1991, the 
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Navy initiated a research and development effort at the Naval Air Warfare Center 
Training Systems Division (NAWCTSD) to identify common behavioral skills associated 
with human error mishaps in aviation. Drawing on prior success in civilian programs, 
seven skills were identified and integrated into the initial form of CRM also known as the 
Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT) program. Realizing the need to train its aviation 
workforce in non-technical coordination skills, the CNO mandated CRM training in 1995 
for all Navy and Marine Corps aviation personnel (OPNAVINST 1542.7A). The training 
consists of a two to three day initial course using lectures, practical exercises, videos and 
case studies. To this day, every crewmember in naval aviation is required to receive the 
introductory CRM course as well as annual training refreshers. Naval aviators also must 
have their CRM skills evaluated by a certified CRM instructor. The Navy’s CRM 
program is discussed in more detail below. 
B. CRM IN NAVAL TRAINING 
1.  Naval CRM Goals 
Safety was the primary reason behind the development of the Naval CRM training 
program (Prince & Salas, 1993). The goal of the Naval CRM training program is to 
provide aviators with the necessary skills in order to “improve mission effectiveness by 
minimizing crew preventable errors, maximizing crew coordination, and optimizing risk 
management” (Chief of Naval Operations, 2001). Since human error still accounts for 
approximately 80% of all naval aviation mishaps (Naval Safety Center, 2006), the 
mission of naval CRM training is to reduce the number of human related errors in 
aviation. There are a multitude of methods and ways to approach changing attitudes and 
behavior in an organization.  The Navy sought to develop an effective academic approach 
to educate and train its personnel in CRM non-technical skills. CRM concepts and 
techniques would be taught in classrooms and evaluated through the use of simulators 
and instructional flight training. In order to achieve this objective, the Navy desired a 
standardized training strategy to incorporate basic principles of CRM training throughout 
naval aviation.  
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2. Evolution of CRM in Naval Aviation 
There are over thirty different types of aircraft used in Navy and Marine Corps 
aviation, ranging from single seat jet fighters to multi-crew rotary airframes. The number 
of different airframes makes applying CRM concepts more challenging than commercial 
aviation. Designing consistent and standardized naval CRM programs is problematic. 
When the Navy began mandating CRM training, it appeared to have been accepted with 
more enthusiasm in some aviation communities as compared to others (Prince & Salas, 
1993). This disparity may have been due to the perceived relevance of the training from 
one community to another. The observed lack of enthusiasm for CRM training in some 
airframes launched vast amounts of research in evaluating potential methods for tailoring 
CRM programs to specific communities. Many studies focused on the manner in which 
programs could be designed and implemented to account for the diversity within naval 
aviation (Oser, Salas, Merket, & Bowers, 2001).   
Identifying fundamental behavioral skills in naval aviation was the initial step 
taken to develop a successful CRM training program. Oser et al. (2001) examined 
existing CRM training programs, evaluated naval safety mishap reports, and conducted 
interviews with subject matter experts (SMEs) to pinpoint some of the critical skills 
involved with aviation performance. Essentially, their research consisted of a needs 
analysis aimed at identifying what competencies were required across a number of 
aviation communities. In addition, several prototype CRM training programs were 
developed to further assess the necessary skills for effective crew coordination and team 
performance in the cockpit (Fowlkes, Lane, Salas, Franz, & Osler, 1994). Together, these 
studies led to the identification and evaluation of seven skill areas required for effective 
aircrew coordination (Prince & Salas, 1993). The seven skills are still currently used in 
Naval CRM programs and discussed in further detail in the following section. 
3. Seven Critical Skills of Naval Crew Resource Management 
Aviation tasks routinely involve skills beyond traditional technical training.  
Through research and practice, certain non-technical skills were identified as critical to 
effective crew coordination in naval aviation. Many of these skills were documented 
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using critical incident reviews with over 200 naval aviation crewmembers to identify 
required team processes (Prince & Salas, 1989). From these studies, seven skills were 
acknowledged by naval aviators as significant proficiencies used during flight operations. 
These skills included decision making, assertiveness, mission analysis, communication, 
leadership, adaptability/flexibility, and situational awareness.  This section provides a 
brief description of each CRM skill currently taught in the Navy’s Crew Resource 
Management Program.  
a. Decision Making 
Decision Making is defined as the skill of selecting a particular course of 
action using logical and sound judgment based upon the available information (Alkov, 
2005). An important component in deciding and executing a specific course of action 
comes from understanding, interpreting, and validating gathered information. This 
includes aspects of assessing and verifying the problem, identifying potential solutions, 
anticipating consequences, informing others of the decision and rationale behind it. 
Effective decision-making involves transforming provided information or data into 
planning and action. Variables required in the decision-making process include, but are 
not limited to: level of uncertainty, experience, time, risk assessment and management.  
Safety is critical in high-risk organizations and because decision making 
can be influenced by time and stress, good decision making skills are important in these 
domains. Aviation is no exception. A study by the National Transportation and Safety 
Board (NTSB) in 1991 revealed that 47% of aircraft accidents in the United States 
between 1983 and 1987 involved poor crew judgment and decision-making (from Flin et 
al., 2008). There have been numerous failures in aviation attributed to a lack of timely 
and effective decision making. The result has expounded research in psychology about 
the types of decision making depending on the environmental conditions. The classic 
rational decision models, where adequate time was available to consider an optimal 
solution, lacked applicability to high stress situations. Many psychologists began looking 
at decision making in time-pressured, demanding, and risky situations. The outcome 
included the theory of Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) (Klein, Orasanu, 
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Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993). NDM research is dedicated to choosing a course of 
action under high ambiguity conditions, or when there is extensive pressure and little 
time (Salas & Klein, 2001). The NDM process is relevant when analyzing decision 
making in naval aviation as situations arise requiring quick and accurate responses. 
Teamwork including crew coordination and communication are 
considered key factors of good decision making applied to team-related tasks. Methods to 
improve team decision-making skills include system or organizational design and formal 
team training (Orasanu & Salas, 1993). These decision-making skills are put to the test 
through simulated team exercises and evaluating communications which develop team 
mental models. Naval CRM training incorporates different decision-making approaches 
and techniques to effectively manage resources, workload, and information within 
military aircrews (Flin et al., 2008). 
b. Assertiveness 
Assertiveness can be classified as a willingness and readiness to actively 
participate in a specific task (Naval Aviation Schools Command, 2008).  In aviation, this 
involves the ability to state and maintain your position (or point of view) until convinced 
by facts, rather than the authority of another individual, that another viable option is 
preferred. Assertiveness entails expressing one’s feelings, concerns, or ideas with a clear 
and direct approach (Jentsch & Smith-Jentsch, 2001). Aircraft accidents have been 
attributed to lack of assertiveness, where voice data recorder tapes indicated a co-pilot’s 
reluctance to question a decision made by the captain (Flin et al., 2008, p. 79).  In the 
military, barriers preventing proper assertiveness can include rank, gender, experience, or 
fear of reprisal.  
Assertiveness is applied as both an attitude and a skill, requiring both 
initiative and courage to act (Jentsch & Smith-Jentsch, 2001). It is important for assertive 
qualities to be distinguished from passive or aggressive methods for resolving conflict. 
Passive refers a failure to stand up for one’s opinion or beliefs. Often passivity is a 
practice used when trying to avoid conflict or confrontation. Frequently, passive attitudes 
and behaviors do not work very well in high-risk situations. Aggressiveness, on the other 
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hand results in a disregard for other’s opinions and input. The behavior can be exhibited 
through both non-verbal and verbal actions. A significant distinction between assertive 
and aggressive behavior is that aggressiveness can be overly dominant, intimidating and 
hostile. However, aggressive attitudes are required in some circumstances such as 
emergencies (Flin et al., 2008). CRM training seeks to educate aviators on recognizing 
the differences between passive, assertive, and aggressive and what situations are 
appropriate for each. Moreover, assertiveness training in CRM programs can be 
evaluated through use of behavioral role modeling and simulation (Foushee & Helmreich, 
1988; Jentsch & Smith-Jentsch, 2001). 
c. Mission Analysis 
Mission analysis is centered on the ability to make short-term, long-term, 
and contingency plans (Naval Aviation Schools Command, 2008). Teaching the concept 
of mission analysis in CRM focuses on ways to understand how to coordinate, allocate 
and monitor crew and available aircraft resources. Aviation mission analysis is 
commonly conducted in the three phases of flight: pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight. 
Pre-flight analysis involves initial planning and briefing in preparation for the mission. 
CRM concepts touch on the need for adequate consideration of foreseeable challenges 
and risks associated with the mission.  In-flight analysis deals with monitoring the 
progress of the mission and identifying any necessary changes or alterations as situations 
arise. CRM highlights that successful in-flight analysis uses the knowledge and 
capabilities of the entire crew and the resources at their disposal. Post-flight addresses the 
proper review of the operation using timely and interactive debriefs.  This provides a way 
to address both crew and individual lessons learned from the mission. 
While mission analysis is important in each stage of aircrew flight 
operations, the pre-flight planning, prioritizing, and assigning of tasks is perhaps the most 
crucial stage (Prince & Salas, 1993).  The pre-mission brief will set the course for the 
events to follow.  Orasanu (1990) conducted an experiment with commercial airline flight 
crews and found that crews with supplementary emergency plans and contingency  
 
 19
strategies ultimately were more effective. Mission analysis remains a valuable skill taught 
in naval CRM to enhance organization and planning in order to reduce error in aircrew 
coordination. 
d. Communication 
Communication is the clear and accurate sending and receiving of 
information, instructions, or commands, and providing useful feedback (Naval Aviation 
Schools Command, 2008). Communication is considered a non-technical skill reflective 
of an organization’s culture and policy, and enhanced through training (Flin et al., 2008). 
The types of communication within a flight crew can be verbal, non-verbal, gestures, 
written, or simple voice inflections.  Further, communication can be affected by age, 
gender, rank, culture, attitude, and task or workload. For example, in naval aviation, 
landing aircraft on naval aircraft carriers is a very complex and dynamic operation. 
Outside the range of external environmental factors, effective communication between 
the ship’s bridge, landing deck and aircraft crew is essential to success. Words, tones, and 
gestures play a significant role in the operation. Research has shown that a breakdown in 
communication in aircrews has been linked to causal factors in many Navy and Marines 
Corps mishaps (Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991).   
Effective communication is comprised of four basic 
elements: clarity, accuracy, timeliness, and usefulness. Clarity, or what Flin et al. (2008) 
describe as explicitness, is clearly stating a desired or intended action while minimizing 
ambiguity. Operational communication requires efficiency; not overloading the receiver 
with too much extraneous information but providing enough to plainly express what 
information is critical for achieving the mission. This is known is naval aviation as 
‘comm-brevity’. Accuracy is making sure the information transmitted from the sender to 
the receiver is correct. The idea of thinking about, or verifying, the facts before you 
transmit information enhances clear communication. Errors occur when the wrong 
information is passed from one source to another individual or a chain of team members. 
The third basic element is timeliness. Timeliness does not imply that all information 
should be disseminated as quickly as possible.  In fact, effective timing knows when 
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information should be sent to the receiver.  This largely depends on the task and 
workload of the individuals involved (Flin et al., 2008). Studies have shown that high 
performing aircrew communicated verbally less often under high workload situations as 
compared to normal flight operations (Orasanu, 1993). Effective flight briefs underscore 
the essential and relevant information pertinent to the mission. Communication 
establishes the foundation for the other CRM skills and is an important component 
leading to successful mission accomplishment in aircrew coordination. 
e. Leadership 
Leadership is taught in naval aviation as the ability to direct and 
coordinate the activities of crewmembers; encouraging the crewmembers to work 
together as a team (Naval Aviation Schools Command, 2008). A delicate balance of 
effective leadership experience, combined with valuable management skills, is an integral 
part of driving any team to success. Naval CRM identifies two distinct types of 
leadership styles: designated and functional. A designated leader is someone who 
possesses the responsibility to make final decisions. In contrast, a functional leader arises 
when the time for leadership is needed or required. Functional leadership is typically a 
result of prior experience and knowledge. Generally, teams have a single leader. 
However, oftentimes leadership skills expand beyond the designated leader to the other 
team members. Therefore, leadership is an important skill for all members of teams. 
A large component of good leadership in aircrew coordination is the 
ability to balance the workload with the resources of a crew (Flin et al., 2008).  In 
military teams, leaders take on increased responsibility to ensure the team achieves the 
mission in a safe and effective manner. A study carried out by Thordsen et al. (1990) 
suggested that micromanagement of Army helicopter aircrews led to poorer performance 
than those teams that were not micromanaged when evaluated in simulated missions. One 
common method to assess leadership skills in aviation is through the observational 
ratings. Ratings of aviators are carried out using behavioral markers that include a section 
on leadership and management (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1.   Leadership Skill Evaluation Using NOTECHS Behavioral Markers  














Adaptability and/or flexibility describe the ability to alter a course of 
action when new information becomes available (Naval Aviation Schools Command, 
2008).  Many situations in aviation arise where a deviation of a particular task is 
warranted.  Emergencies are a prime example of the need for adaptability.  CRM focuses 
on ensuring that crewmembers are aware of planned missions and understand the 
possibility of change. Offering alternative solutions to unexpected circumstances may be 
required. Aircrews must be flexible to change anticipated courses of action in order to 
respond to demands of a particular mission or task.  Research has indicated that lack of 
flexibility and adaptability in naval aviation has contributed to Navy and Marine Corps 
mishaps (Hartel et al., 1991). Adaptability also is related to leadership in dynamic 
environments like naval aviation. As situations change, in terms of unexpected risk, 
weather, or degraded communications, leadership skills must adapt to meet those 
challenges. CRM instruction discusses ways to increase adaptability, including more 
effective mission planning analysis, preparing for multi-role missions, and expecting 
some variations in execution. 
g. Situational Awareness  
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A common definition of situational awareness stems from Endsley (1995) 
as she describes it as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume 
of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status 
in the near future” (p. 36). In Naval CRM programs, situational awareness is the degree 
of accuracy by which one's perception of the current environment mirrors reality (Naval 
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Aviation Schools Command, 2008). It is a cognitive skill based in perception and 
attention. Situational awareness can be influenced by a myriad of individual factors 
including processing limitations, memory, and mental models. Research has shown that 
in a large number of commercial aviation accidents attributed to human error, problems 
with situational awareness played a significant role (Endsley, 1995). 
Situational awareness as a skill encompasses being conscious and 
understanding of what is happening both inside and outside the aircraft. Although its 
roots derive from air combat maneuvering and military battlefields, situational awareness 
has been adopted as a means of improving safety in a variety of vocations. Effective 
situational awareness means staying oriented in time and space, focused on 
requirements. Human factors that can degrade situational awareness include: insufficient 
communication, fatigue, stress, task load, groupthink, or degraded operating conditions. 
Cognitive skills are difficult to train and even more difficult to assess.  The Naval CRM 
program addresses situational awareness through methods the brain uses to store, process, 
and recall information.  
The seven skills are the core elements used in the Navy to train its aviator 
crew personnel the competencies for successful crew resource management.  Because 
these fundamental skills are non-technical in nature, it remains challenging to measure 
just how lucrative a CRM training program can be; especially with a course based heavily 
in cognitive and behavioral proficiencies. In order to productively evaluate the 
effectiveness of the CRM program, a logical process must be applied.  The next section 
discusses some common methods and approaches to gauge utility of CRM training in 
order to decompose the evaluation into reasonable steps. 
C. EVALUATING CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
1. Purpose of a Training Assessment 
Evaluating a training program can indicate whether the training is meeting its 
intention and goals. Analysis may include a review of the program’s objectives, methods, 
feedback, and results in terms of its overall effectiveness. Goldstein (2002) defines 
training evaluation as a “systematic collection of descriptive and judgmental information 
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necessary to make effective training decisions related to the selection, adoption, value 
and modification of various instructional activities” (p. 138). Training is futile if it does 
not make a difference that provides practical relevance and value to an organization 
(Holt, Boehm-Davis, & Beaubien, 2001). The impact of training may be seen on one or 
more distinctive levels including the individual, the team, and the organization.  As stated 
earlier, the purpose and goal of CRM training is to improve safety of a crew through 
concepts directed at improving coordination, communication and awareness. An effective 
evaluation helps validate and determine if the current CRM program positively impacts 
human capital and maximizes use of available resources in naval aviation. 
2. Common Evaluation Techniques 
There are several techniques used to evaluate the effectiveness of a training 
system or program. Most of these methods address issues of learning and retention, 
measuring on-the-job performance, and investigating the value added in terms of cost 
benefit. The objective of the training being conducted provides a fundamental basis for 
selecting an appropriate evaluation process.  Specific methods used to evaluate programs 
are largely dependent on the knowledge, skills, or attitudes outcomes desired as a result 
of the training.  Consideration must be given to whether the training is primarily directed 
at task-related or team-related competencies. Most task-related training relies on Transfer 
of Training (ToT) evaluation techniques, measuring precise performance criteria (Roscoe 
& Williges, 1975). However, CRM is predominantly based on instructing behavioral 
skills and therefore requires a multifaceted evaluation approach. 
A multifaceted evaluation approach is preferred when examining CRM training 
effects in aviation as it considers several levels of assessment (Gregorich & Wilhelm, 
1993; Kraiger, Ford, & Salas, 1993). The major focus of this thesis is founded on 
evaluating CRM’s validity and its effects on participants’ reactions, effect of learning, 
and organizational outcomes. In order to examine the effects of CRM on naval aviation, it 




terms of their reactions, attitudes and knowledge. The present study considers how CRM 
training continues to affect the Navy as an organization in terms of improved safety and 
reduction of mishaps.  
3. Previous Navy CRM Assessments 
As with the commercial aviation industry, there has been a multitude of literature 
written, and studies evaluating, aspects of CRM and its effectiveness in naval aviation 
(see O’Connor, Campbell, Newon, Melton, Salas, Wilson, 2008; Salas, Burke, Bowers, 
Wilson, 2001; Salas, Wilson, Burke, & Wightman 2006; for reviews).  These studies 
looked at the usefulness of training on distinctive levels by assessing the impact of 
training ranging from individual to organizational training effects (O'Connor, Hahn, & 
Salas, in press). Only a few of the studies applied a multi-faceted approach to their 
evaluations. However, many of these studies analyzed CRM effectiveness in term of 
participants’ reactions to the training, their changes in attitudes and behaviors, as well as 
the impact the training had on the organization.  O’Connor, Hahn, & Salas (in press) 
summarized eight studies that previously analyzed naval aviation CRM training (see 
Table 2). 
 
Table 2.   Prior Studies of CRM Training Effectiveness in Naval Aviation (From O’Connor 
et al., in press, p. 5-6). 
Author Participants Reactions Learning Behaviour Organisation
Alkov (1991); Alkov & Gaynor 
(1991); Alkov (1989)
90 aircrew Positive shift in attitudes. Aircrew error mishap rate 
declined.
Baker et al. (1991) 41 helicopter 
pilots. 
Positive reaction
Brannick et al (1995) 51 aircrew Better than average in 
performing CRM 
behaviors
O’Connor (under review) 371 naval 
aviators, and 272 
Navy divers.
Aviators significantly more 
positive attitudes to CRM 
than divers.
No significant difference 
in attitudes pre- and post- 
training.
Significant increase in 
knowledge of CRM 
principles.
No significant difference 
in attitudes between 
trained and controls.
Trained aviators scored 
significantly better on 
knowledge test than 
controls.
Positive shift in attitudes.
Significant increase in 
knowledge of CRM 
principles
Positive change in 
attitudes, but not 
significant.
No significant difference 
in scores on knowledge 
test than controls.




56% of the mishaps had at least 
one CRM causal factors. 
Comparable to the 58% air crew 
error rate found by Yacavone 
(1993) in an examination of 308 
naval aviation mishaps (1986-90).




Positive reaction Trained crews 
performed better than 
untrained crews as 
measure by 
TARGETs.
Stout, Salas & Kraiger (1996); 12 helicopter 
pilots (10 serving 
as a control 
group) .
Positive reaction Trained participants 
performed on average 
8% more desired 
behaviours than 
control as measured 
by TARGETs.
Salas et al. (1999) 35 pilots & 34 
enlisted 
helicopter aircrew 
Positive reaction. Trained crews 
performed better than 




pilots (12 serving 
as controls).
Positive reaction  Trained better during 
pre-flight brief, and 
greater number of 
teamwork behaviours 
during high workload 




The CRM studies (listed in Table 2) assessed, at a minimum, one level of analysis 
corresponding to Kirkpatrick’s (1976) hierarchy of training evaluation. This hierarchy is 
a commonly used method to assess the effectiveness of a training program across 
multiple levels within an organization and is discussed in further detail in the following 
section.  
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4. Applying Kirkpatrick’s Topology of Evaluation 
Kirkpatrick’s (1976) topology centers on four fundamental levels of assessment.  
These include measuring and analyzing participants’ reactions, learning, behavior, and 
results or outcomes (see Figure 1). Since CRM programs focus on non-technical 
behavioral skills, Kirkpatrick’s approach has been chosen as a useful framework for 
evaluating naval aviation CRM training at multiple levels.  
 
Figure 1.   Kirkpatrick’s Hierarchy of Evaluation 
a. Reactions 
Kirkpatrick’s first level of training evaluation, “reactions,” is concerned 
with simply the satisfaction of the participants with the training. It is a measure of 
whether the reactions of the trainees were positive or negative. In essence, it is a way to 
determine customer satisfaction and often referred to as a “happy sheet.” Conventional 
methods of quantifying reactions are typically performed through the use of surveys. 
Survey questions are centered on assessing whether the participants enjoyed a particular 
training program. Responses can be indicated as simple as marking one single check on a 
rating scale. For example, ‘how did you like the training?’ Another means for 
determining trainee reactions is through use of a detailed inquiry into an assortment of 
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opinions, such as open-ended responses to specifics about the training.  For example, 
“what part of the training was of most value to you?” However, most reaction data for 
CRM programs are collected and evaluated using a simple Likert scale response survey 
or through asking participants to rank order perceived utility of CRM components (Salas, 
Burke et al., 2001). 
Kirkpatrick (1996) contends that assessing how people feel about the 
training is important for two primary reasons. First, management decisions regarding 
training are often based on feedback provided from trainees (Kirkpatrick, 1996). If there 
exists a general feeling that the training seems useless or unpleasant, it may be subject to 
termination.  Managers and supervisors deeply desire for their employees to enjoy the 
training in their organization.  Besides, training is not cheap.  A great deal of resources, 
manpower and money, are directed towards successful training programs. Organizations 
genuinely yearn for these investments to be worthwhile so as to avoid wasting time and 
assets on training, potentially leading to pessimistic attitudes.  
Secondly, it is important to understand trainees’ reactions simply because 
reactions may influence learning. Research has been unsuccessful in directly linking 
satisfaction with the effectiveness of a training program (Mathieu, Tannenbaum, & Salas, 
1992; Alliger & Janak, 1989). However, few would argue that it makes sense to conduct 
a training program with unfavorable reactions. Positive responses, unlike negative, are 
rarely harmful to the learning process. In fact, many would argue that positive reactions 
may enhance an individual’s motivation to learn (Salas, Burke et al., 2001). An 
individual who enjoys a training course can become readily enthusiastic and receptive to 
learning.   On the other hand, if a person feels the training is of no value, it can reduce the 
likelihood learning took place (Kirkpatrick, 1996). It is important to realize negative 
reactions are not always adverse. Honest reactions can inform decision makers for 
potential areas of improvement in a course or prospective changes to instruction methods.   
Assessing the reactions of participants is common practice in many 
training organizations. Unfortunately, analyzing reactions is often misconstrued as a 
method to evaluate a program in its entirety. Just because a training program receives 
enthusiastic reviews does not correlate to the value added or make the training 
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necessarily effective (Kirkpatrick, 1996). Likewise, learning and change can occur even 
if the participant does not particularly enjoy the instruction. Organizations commonly fail 
to conduct necessary higher-level evaluations (Lovell, 2007). Reaction assessment, 
although important and constructive, is only the first step in the evaluation process, and 
further efforts are needed to assure learning and outcomes are going to result from the 
training. 
b. Learning  
Learning is the second tier of evaluation in Kirkpatrick’s hierarchy.  There 
are two distinct characteristics of measuring learning: knowledge (or skill) and attitudes. 
First, learning can be expressed as the degree to which knowledge or skills were acquired 
as a result of the training (Kirkpatrick, 1996). A training program can affect learning 
through cultivating both declarative and procedural types of knowledge. Declarative 
knowledge refers to the factual information that can be encoded and recalled from one’s 
memory. Procedural knowledge addresses applying a specific learned behavior to a 
situation or task (Holt et al., 2001). The most common method to assess the knowledge 
and skills gained from a training program is to measure performance, typically via a test 
or examination. Standardized tests are popular and efficient, but do not allow for 
flexibility from program to program. Organizations are unique and therefore require 
specially designed assessment tools.  
Next, learning deals with changes in attitudes. The objective of a training 
program may be to change attitudes towards policies, procedures, the organization, or the 
job itself (Phillips, 1991). If the training is designed for attitudinal modifications, an 
evaluation of these attitudes is warranted.  The effect of time on individuals’ attitudes can 
also play a factor. Therefore, measuring trainee’s attitudes can be tricky and complex. 
Attitudes can be measured using surveys, focus groups, interviews, and through 
observation. The purpose of attitude assessments can provide the organization insight on 
selecting and developing personnel, ways to improve a training program, gauge progress 
and monitor trends. 
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Measuring the amount of learning transfer is much more complex than 
measuring reactions. It is important to note that learning does not take into account the 
transfer of knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSAs) to a specific job, rather how well these 
attributes were acquired and retained. The application of KSAs is more relevant when 
addressing the behavioral outcomes of the trainee and is included in the following 
discussion. 
c. Behaviors 
The third level in Kirkpatrick’s hierarchy, behavior, deals with the degree 
to which the training changed or altered the performance associated with a job or skill. A 
widely used technique to evaluate the behavior of trainees is carried out through the use 
of a structured observational system (Flin et al., 2008).  Observational data can be a 
useful and important metric of performance, but the data can be subjective and may not 
be an accurate measure of how the participants would behave in the ‘real world’ when 
they are no longer being observed. Although helpful, behavior evaluation methods are 
tedious and lengthy. Monitoring job performance in aviation presents its own challenges. 
It requires a large amount of manpower and is resource intensive. For these reasons, a 
behavior analysis of CRM is omitted from this research effort, yet recommended for 
consideration in future efforts. 
d. Results 
The highest, and most powerful, measure of training effectiveness is to 
examine impacts at the organizational level (Kirkpatrick, 1996). Kirkpatrick uses 
evaluation of results to assess the outcomes of a program and whether the training 
concepts had any bearing on the overall objectives. Results are linked to direct impact the 
training made on the organization as a whole. Some outcomes are relatively easy to 
measure. For example measuring quantitative metrics such as production output or profit 
margin for a corporation is fairly straightforward. Others can be more complicated to 
assess, like improved customer satisfaction and employee morale. Perhaps the most 
popular ways to measure training outcome or results is through cost savings or return on 
investment (ROI) studies. ROI attempts to assess the value added to an organization. 
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However, in naval aviation the purpose of CRM training is to improve mission 
effectiveness by reducing possible errors. The cost associated with replacing trained 
aircrew not to mention the multi-million dollars in aircraft makes CRM worthwhile if a 
single accident is avoided.  
Measuring mission effectiveness is not easy to assess as there are many 
variables involved. O’Connor et al. (2002) looked at 48 separate CRM studies in 
commercial and military aviation. Many of these studies evaluated CRM on multiple 
levels. Yet, only 17% of the studies even attempted to assess the outcomes and impact 
CRM had on the respective organizations and just five of the studies were related to 
military aviation. The low percentage of studies addressing results of CRM may be due to 
difficulty in linking the behavioral training to direct and tangible outcomes. Isolating the 
variables that contribute to the achievement of the mission is nearly impossible. 
Furthermore, even if a mission is considered a success, it does not necessarily imply 
efficiency or effectiveness.  
An accepted method of analyzing CRM’s organizational impact on 
aircrew coordination is to analyze historical safety data. This is typically accomplished 
through examining aviation mishap occurrences and rates over a period of time, usually 
years. Alkov (1989), in a study looking at naval aviation, cited a decrease in mishap rates 
as a result of CRM training across three specific categories of naval airframes (rotary, 
attack bombers, and multi-crew fighters). This study was performed over a four year 
period from 1986-1990. The estimated cost of the CRM program (over a five year period) 
was less than a million dollars, which is minimal compared to the loss associated with 
personnel or aircraft. A handful of other studies have evaluated safety mishap rates in 
naval aviation across the 1977-1996 timeframe. Chapter VI of this thesis presents a 
detailed look into these earlier studies with regards to mishap rates and uses them as a 
baseline to analyze CRM’s impact on safety over the last decade. 
D. SUMMARY 
When evaluating any program, it is imperative to measure the training based on 
the organizational objectives. Evaluation is based on information gathered from measures 
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at each criterion level including reactions, learning, behavior, and results. A successful 
evaluation does not solve all training issues, but it can shed light on the effectiveness of a 
program’s content, delivery, and impact on the organization. There have been several 
studies on the success and implementation of Crew Resource Management training in 
military aviation. However, most of the studies were conducted some time ago. The 
research carried out in this thesis built upon prior studies and applies the principles of 
three levels of Kirkpatrick’s topology to provide an up to date assessment of the naval 
CRM program.  Prior CRM studies relevant to this analysis were broken down into the 
criteria of reactions, learning (in terms of both attitudes and knowledge), and results.  
Each level is discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapters.  
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III. NAVAL AVIATION CRM REACTION ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND 
Learner reaction is one common metric collected when evaluating a training 
program. It is the first level of assessment in Kirkpatrick’s topology of training evaluation 
(Kirkpatrick, 1976). Reactions of individuals from training can be collected using a 
variety of techniques including questionnaires, interviews, focus groups, and observation 
(Phillips, 1996). Although many different methods exist to gather reaction data, feedback 
is frequently collected through the design and implementation of survey assessments. 
These reaction surveys are traditionally comprised of a paper-based questionnaire 
administered at the conclusion of a training curriculum. The surveys are normally 
structured for respondents to answer questions regarding their satisfaction using a Likert 
rating scale. One of the benefits to using paper-based surveys is that individuals’ 
responses are generally collected immediately following the conclusion of the training. 
Recency effects on memory indicate participants are more likely to recall their feelings 
and experiences regarding a program right away (Wickens & Hollands, 2000, p. 281). 
Too much time elapsed between participation and eliciting feedback can increase 
assessment difficulty.  
As the use of technology becomes more widespread in training, it has become 
common practice to distribute electronic or web-based satisfaction surveys.  Electronic 
surveys also can be administered quickly after training, but risk losing oversight in timely 
completion of the assessment. A major benefit in distributing electronic surveys is having 
the ability to sample learners in distance learning programs. In addition, the data 
collection and analysis can be streamlined. To understand the value in assessing reactions 
of CRM training, one must consider the differences between enjoyment and perceived 
usefulness of the program.   
1. Reaction Affect and Utility 
Reaction feedback can include two distinct types of data indicating the 
satisfaction of a training program. These include (a) the participants’ feelings, thoughts, 
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or emotions about the design, content, and delivery of concepts in the program and (b) 
the perception of whether the training was worthwhile or useful. Alliger et al. (1997) 
referred to these two measures as affect and utility.  Affective reactions are usually easier 
to assess as compared to utility.  Evaluating trainees’ affective reactions is as simple as 
having participants rate how they “liked” the training. This can be either an overall rating 
of the entire program, or specific to each topic or session.  
The second type of measurement is a utility-based reaction.  These questions are 
centered on whether a training program will translate well to the actual job or task. Utility 
assessments are designed to discover the perceived usefulness or value of the training 
from its participants (Alliger, Tannenbaum, Bennet, & Holly Traver, 1997). Helmreich 
and Wilhelm (1991) claimed that “it is axiomatic that training will have more impact if 
participants perceive it as useful.” If an individual perceives the training is going to be 
utilized and provide value to their future experience, this can increase their willingness to 
participate and increase motivation. 
Furthermore, it is entirely possible that reaction assessment data might include a 
combination of affective and utility measurements. But, do reactions have any bearing on 
the effectiveness of the training? Many would agree positive reactions do not necessarily 
link to an increase in knowledge or attitude changes. Affective reactions seem to have 
little, if any, relationship to amount of learning transfer. However, utility reactions are 
believed to influence motivation and willingness to learn (Salas, Burke et al., 2001).  
2. Previous Studies of CRM Reactions 
O’Connor et al. (2008) conducted a meta-analysis of 16 prior CRM studies which 
looked at both the affective and/or utility reactions of CRM participants. The studies 
represented CRM training programs in various industries including commercial and 
military aviation, medicine, nuclear power, offshore oil production, and commercial 
shipping. Of the 16 analyses, seven included an assessment of the reactions to the 
training. These seven studies reported participant responses using a 5-point Likert scale. 
The combined mean response across the seven studies indicated a general favorable 
reaction to CRM training (M = 4.18; O'Connor et al., 2008). Salas, Burke et al. (2001) 
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reviewed 58 studies evaluating effectiveness of CRM programs in a similar fashion. Of 
the 58 studies, 27 (46%) looked at participants’ reactions, many of which indicated 
participants had a favorable reaction to the CRM training programs.  
Other studies have addressed reactions related to specific components of CRM 
training. Results from some of these studies suggested CRM training had greater 
perceived utility when administered through scenario-based learning and case studies 
rather than traditional lecture formats (Schiewe, 1995).  Positive affective reactions are 
believed to be amplified with training that promotes interaction rather than passive 
teaching. However, it should be noted that different industries are likely to have varying 
CRM training concepts and delivery methods. For example, a commercial aviation CRM 
strategy might focus more on crews who do not work together on a continuous basis, 
whereas CRM in the medical field may approach CRM team cohesion concepts with 
surgical teams who routinely work together. Nevertheless, each of these earlier meta-
analyses indicates trainees, in general, sense the utility of CRM training. The literature 
concerned with reaction analysis exclusively for naval aviation CRM is discussed below. 
3. Reactions to Naval CRM Training 
Several studies have examined the reactions of naval aviators to CRM training. 
Five studies, in particular, looked at reactions and the usefulness of CRM training across 
various platforms of naval aviation. Each of the five studies indicated that aviators in 
both the Navy and Marine Corps tended to be enthusiastic about the usefulness of CRM 
training (Baker, Bauman, & Zalesny, 1991; Salas et al., 1999; Stout, Salas, & Fowlkes, 
1997; Stout, Salas, & Kraiger, 1996). Many CRM participants felt the training was 
beneficial in aspects of flight safety, crew coordination, and mission accomplishment 
(Salas et al., 1999). The reactions from these studies were generally positive and 
consistent across different airframes. The studies included responses from rotary wing 
and fixed wing aviators. 
4. Reaction Hypotheses 
Despite numerous studies in aviation illustrating positive reactions towards CRM 
topics, the most recent collection of Naval aviation CRM reaction data was obtained well 
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over a decade ago. As CRM training program for Navy and Marine Corps aviation has 
not drastically changed since that time, one might assume this would lead to observing 
the same positive reactions towards CRM. This section attempts to examine this 
assumption. Although the Navy’s CRM program has remained relatively constant, it is 
possible reactions of CRM participants could change over time. Therefore, it is important 
to re-evaluate the reactions of naval aviators using more recent data.  
This chapter assesses Kirkpatrick’s first level of evaluation (reactions) for naval 
aviators. An examination of CRM reactions was accomplished by analyzing a sample of 
reaction data gathered from Navy and Marine Corps aviators who participated in CRM 
training over a period of nine years using data collected via surveys from fiscal years 
2000 to 2008. This section of the CRM analysis used the data to evaluate three 
experimental reaction hypotheses. The first hypothesis analyzes general changes and 
trends of aviator reactions from Naval CRM training over the past nine years. 
H1: Reactions of aviators to the Navy CRM training program have become less 
positive over time.  
The amount of exposure for all aviation crewmembers to CRM concepts and training 
could affect reactions over a period of time. As CRM training continues to be required on 
a regular basis, there is potential for the training to become repetitive and stale. If this 
were the case, it could reflect in the reactions of the trainees across several years.  
The second proposed hypothesis evaluates differences in reactions amongst more 
senior and experienced naval aviators as compared to less-experience junior officers.  
H2: Junior aviation officers will be significantly more positive in their reactions 
towards the concepts addressed in CRM training than senior aviation officers.  
One method to distinguish experienced aviators in the military is to break groups into 
rank divisions. Here, the separation was made between junior and senior aviators. In this 
study, “junior” aviators were defined as officers in the O1 to O3 ranks and the senior 
aviation officers were identified in the O4 to O6 category. As a rule of thumb, O1 to O3 
officers have less than six or seven years of experience, where O4 to O6 ranks typically 
have over seven years experience. Again, the amount of exposure to CRM training 
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concepts can possibly play a role in enthusiasm for the training.  The junior aviators may 
have more to gain from the training than more experienced officers may. Conversely, 
senior officers may recognize the need to train towards non-technical concepts or desire 
more CRM instruction to refresh concepts if they have been out of the cockpit for some 
time.  
Since there are numerous types of airframes used throughout the Maritime 
services, each aircraft can be sorted into three different categories.  The first is the rotary 
wing category, namely helicopters. The second is tactical jet fighters, also referred to as 
TACAIR.  The third category includes most other types of airframes and is labeled large 
or “big wing” aircraft. The big wing aircraft group encompasses most large, fixed wing 
aircraft.  
The third hypothesis seeks to investigate differences amongst aviators trained in 
various types of Navy and Marine Corps airframes. 
H3: Large wing and rotary wing aviators will be significantly more positive in 
their reactions to the concepts addressed in CRM training than tactical jet 
aviators.  
Predominantly, tactical jets are comprised of single seat aircraft. The Navy and Marine 
Corps have various single seat airframes (e.g., F/A-18s). Since crew resource 
management generally focuses on aspects of crew coordination and team-related 
competencies, single seat aviators might demonstrate a lack of enthusiasm for the 
program. Research has suggested that, historically, a larger portion of mishaps due to 
some form of CRM failure was seen in rotary wing aircrew compare to what was seen in 
TACAIR (Wiegmann & Shappell, 1999). This could be a result of having multi-person 
crews in rotary wing aircraft as compared to single seat aircraft (this will be discussed 
further in Chapter VI). Nevertheless, the perceived utility of CRM in multi-crew rather 
than single seat aircraft may affect reaction outcomes as a result of CRM training. 
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B. METHODOLOGY 
1. Data Collection 
Currently, U.S. Naval Aviation commands are directed to administer a command 
safety climate assessment approximately every two years (Naval Safety Center, 2009). 
These climate surveys are designed to gauge a unit’s general safety posture and used 
primarily as a feedback tool for Commanding Officers. For aviation communities, each 
safety climate survey seeks to estimate the utility of the command’s CRM program. In 
particular, one question from the safety assessment directly addresses with the CRM 
program and its perceived usefulness by trainees. The question attempts to investigate if a 
command's Crew Resource Management (CRM) program is helping to improve mission 
performance and safety. The question reads as follows: “My command’s Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) program is helping to improve mission performance and safety.” 
Each participant was asked to respond to the question by rating their level of agreement 
using a 5-point Likert scale (1 having answered “disagree strongly” to 5 having answered 
“agree strongly”). The responses to this item were examined as a measure of the fleet’s 
reaction to the usefulness of CRM training. 
2. Sample 
CRM reaction responses were obtained from the Naval Safety Center from each 
naval aviation commands’ safety climate surveys. For this study, the data collected 
included 51,570 responses from Navy and Marine Corps aviation officers who took a 
safety climate survey in the past nine years (2000-2008). The officers varied in seniority, 
ranging from the officer ranks of O1 to O6.  Each aviator in the data set was classified 
into one of three categories based upon their airframe experience, self indicated at the 
time of the survey.  The three categories included rotary wing (helicopters), tactical jets 
(TACAIR), and other large fixed wing (big wing) aircraft. A breakdown of the 
demographics for the officers is listed in Table 3. Each of the safety climate survey 
respondents remained anonymous and unidentifiable. Therefore, it was possible, even 
probable, aviators responded to different safety climate assessments on multiple 
occasions over the nine-year period.  The assumption of sample independence should still 
hold true as responses were categorized by year and analyzed separately. 
 
Table 3.   Percent Representation of Reaction Response by Category (2000-2008) 
O1‐O3 O4‐O6 Total % of sample
Helo 26.49% 9.78% 36.27%
TACAIR 25.52% 11.89% 37.41%
Big Wing 15.67% 10.65% 26.32%
Total % of sample 67.68% 32.32%  
 
C. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
1. Overall CRM Reaction Trend 
Reactions of U.S. Naval aviators to CRM training were analyzed by fiscal year to 
determine any change in reaction over time. Across all ranks and airframes the average 
response rating provided by the sample of Navy and Marine Corps aviators regarding the 
utility of CRM concepts from 2000 to 2008 was found to be generally positive (M = 4.09, 
SD = 0.70). The reaction responses indicate a very slight increase in positive reactions 
over the nine-year period (see Figure 2). The data was sorted by year and independently 
analyzed. Each year was compared the others in the group. A Kruskal-Wallis non-
parametric analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to examine differences in mean 
reaction responses to CRM training across the nine year period (χ2 = 338.378, df = 8, 
p<0.01). It was found that there was a significant difference between the earlier years 
(2000-2002) as compared to mean reaction responses seen in later years (2003-2008).  
































Figure 2.   Mean comparisons of Naval aviation CRM reaction response from fiscal years 
2000 to 2008 (with standard error bars included for each year). 
2. Reactions Response by Experience 
 Navy and Marine Corps aviation officers were divided into two experience levels 
based on military rank (junior officers, O1 to O3; senior officers, O4 to O6). The average 
reaction responses to CRM training were examined by year and by rank. Figure 3 shows 
the graphical comparison of mean reaction responses for naval aviation officers by 




































Figure 3.   Mean comparison of Naval aviation CRM reaction response from fiscal years 
2000 to 2008 by rank (with standard error bars included for each year). 
Differences between the two rank groups were analyzed independently by year. A 
nonparametric statistical comparison using the Mann Whitney test was conducted to look 
at differences in rank independently for each year. The results of the Mann Whitney test 
are shown in Table 4. As can be seen, no significant difference was found from fiscal 
year 2000 to 2003. However, from 2004 to 2008 senior officers were significantly more 







Table 4.   Mann Whitney Comparison for Naval Reactions by Rank 
Year Sample (n) U p‐value
2000 869 78363 n/s
2001 3184 1025008 n/s
2002 1737 278893 n/s
2003 4929 2181732 n/s
2004 4770 2472111 p < 0.01
2005 8423 6806289 p < 0.01
2006 8883 7507284 p < 0.01
2007 10176 9885232 p < 0.01
2008 8599 6835045 p < 0.01  
 
3. Reaction Responses by Airframe 
The data set was partitioned once again into reaction response based on each 
Navy and Marine Corps aviators’ indicated experience with respect to airframe (Helo, 
TACAIR, Big wing). The yearly trend in mean CRM reaction response corresponding to 







































Figure 4.   Mean comparison of Naval aviation CRM reaction response from fiscal years 
2000 to 2008 by airframe (with standard error bars included for each year). 
A supplementary statistical analysis was conducted to compare the means across 
each of the three airframe categories across the nine year time frame. Because the data 
was assumed to be a non-normal distribution, independent and non-parametric in nature, 
a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance test was performed.  The results of the 
Kruskal-Wallis test (df = 2) is shown in Table 5. As can be seen in Figure 4 and from the 
Kruskal-Wallis test, TACAIR aviators had significantly less positive reactions to CRM 
training in fiscal years 2001 and 2002. However, by 2003 TACAIR reactions became 
increasingly more positive and similar to those of rotary and big wing aircrew. The 
differences seen between the groups in 2004 through 2006 are due to a slightly higher 
mean reaction response of big wing aviators as measured up to the mean reaction 
response of TACAIR and rotary wing aviators. 
 
 43
Table 5.   Kruskal-Wallis Comparison Using CRM Reaction Means by Airframe 
Year Sample (n) χ2 p‐value
2000 869 8.26 0.016
2001 3184 38.34 p < 0.01
2002 1737 19.76 p < 0.01
2003 4929 6.75 0.034
2004 4770 15.23 p < 0.01
2005 8423 17.83 p < 0.01
2006 8883 21.41 p < 0.01
2007 10176 7.01 0.03
2008 8599 6.35 0.042  
 
D. DISCUSSION 
1. General CRM Reactions 
Hypothesis one (reactions of aviators to the Navy CRM training program have 
become less positive over time) was not supported. In fact, the reaction response 
increased very slightly over the period from 2000 to 2008. However, the change in mean 
response was not significant year by year. The overall results suggested that participants 
were positive about Naval CRM training and perceived the CRM training as useful. 
The overall mean reaction response to the Naval CRM program (M = 4.09) 
indicates that CRM is generally well accepted. The results indicated a similar positive 
mean reaction response as compared to the previous CRM reaction studies in naval 
aviation that also showed positive reactions (O'Connor et al., 2008). These findings were 
also consistent with previous literature reviews concluding that CRM participants 
perceived the training as useful with favorable reactions (O’Connor et al., 2002; Salas, 
Burke et al., 2001; Salas et al., 2006). While the reactions, in general, were positive 
across all naval aviators, there was a considerable amount of variability in participant 
reactions. Some factors affecting the variability might have been due to differences in 
instructional techniques or alterations of CRM training at a command level. Instructors 
can also play a critical role in trainees’ enthusiasm for the course. 
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2. CRM Reactions by Rank 
A slight increase in reaction response was seen in both junior and senior Navy and 
Marine Corps aviators across the nine-year time period. Interestingly, the reaction 
responses for both rank groups appeared to increase in the positive direction, specifically 
between fiscal years 2002 and 2003. No evidence was found to suggest a reason for the 
sudden boost in reaction responses after 2003. A speculative reason might be due to a 
change in culture as CRM becomes more accepted in the naval aviation community.   
Examining the two rank subsets, senior aviators appeared to be consistently less 
positive over the 2000-2002 time frames. However, after 2003, the senior aviators’ 
positive reaction responses rose to eventually match and supersede those of junior 
aviators. This result was contrary to what was expected in hypothesis two (junior aviation 
officers will be significantly more positive in their reactions towards the concepts 
addressed in CRM training than senior aviation officers). A possible explanation for these 
trends might include an increase in the perceived utility of CRM concepts for senior 
officers who have been out of the cockpit for some time. Senior aviators also might 
believe CRM training is a good method to refresh critical non-technical skills used in 
aircrew coordination. Additionally, as aviators in the Navy and Marine Corps become 
more experienced, team cohesion and communication concepts may be more openly 
received. The speculation is that maturity may foster a more favorable reaction to risk 
mitigation and safety issues as compared to those seen in less experienced aviators.  
3. CRM Reactions by Airframe 
There was an increase in mean response ratings across all airframes (Helo, 
TACAIR, and Big wing) over the past decade. A comparable spike in reactions was 
noticed between fiscal year’s 2002 and 2003.  However, the increase in response ratings 
appeared to be larger for the TACAIR aviators during this time. TACAIR aviators 
revealed a lower mean reaction response from 2000 to 2002 as compared to those of the 
rotary and fixed wing personnel. Although the findings did not denote a significant 
difference between reactions of TACAIR and rotary or big wing aviators, the slight trend 
of lower reactions in the early years provides some support for the third hypothesis (large 
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wing and rotary wing aviators will be significantly more positive in their reactions to the 
concepts addressed in CRM training than tactical jet aviators). Moreover, after fiscal year 
2003, the TACAIR aviators’ reactions came closer to those of rotary and fixed wing 
personnel.  Findings may reflect previous efforts to tailor command CRM training more 
toward specific TACAIR applications.  
Consideration must be given to the idea that individual responses are accurate and 
correspond to a person’s true feelings. Darby (2008) found that using Likert scales to 
ascertain feedback of students in training programs may not be as accurate as once 
thought. The results of Darby’s (2008) study suggested responses to Likert scale 
questionnaires tended to skew more towards positive responses on virtually all measures 
of evaluation. It is possible naval aviators may be susceptible to a favorable response bias 
as CRM concepts are universally accepted as “positive” behavioral characteristics. An 
individual who responds that they did not perceive the training as useful may be 
translated into a feeling a disagreement with the principles of the CRM program. Another 
bias may result from the aviation culture itself.  Naval officers may feel that negative 
responses indicate a need for change, and that change typically implies unwanted added 
responsibilities or duties. 
E. SUMMARY 
Even though a reaction analysis is usually the easiest form of assessment criteria, 
it is an important part of evaluating any training program. The results of this study 
suggest reactions to CRM training in Navy and Marine Corps aviation are favorable. 
Despite the differences in CRM training from command to command, aviators across 
various types of aircraft perceived it as useful and indicated it was helping to improve 
mission performance and safety. Historically, comparable studies similarly found 
reactions to CRM training in aviation have been positive (O’Connor et al., 2002; Salas, 
Burke et al., 2001; Salas et al., 2006). Naval CRM reactions are predominantly positive, 
and if there are any changes at all over the last decade, it would be in the slightly more 
positive direction. 
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Nevertheless, it is important to remember that positive reactions do not 
necessarily correspond to the overall effectiveness of a program (Kirkpatrick, 1976). 
Positive reactions to naval CRM training do hint at the validity and credibility of the 
program, providing a metric for higher-level management support. Because the safety 
climate surveys were distributed across multiple naval aviation commands, the 
affirmative reactions of the participants implied that core CRM concepts are well 
received. However, the reality is that reactions are only the first step in evaluating a 
training program and further levels of assessment need to be completed.  The next two 
chapters consider the second level of Kirkpatrick’s (1976) hierarchy framework deal with 
learning outcomes related to Naval CRM. 
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IV. NAVAL AVIATION CRM ATTITUDINAL ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND 
The next two chapters discuss methods to assess learning outcomes of the Naval 
CRM program. This analysis applies Kirkpatrick’s topology to look at the second level of 
evaluation: the learning outcomes from CRM training. As previously mentioned, learning 
can be divided into two main functions or goals: changing participant attitudes and 
improving the knowledge or skill of the trainee. This chapter’s primary focus is on an 
attitudinal evaluation of the CRM program. 
1. Attitudes of Aviators 
Attitudes of trainees often are confused with reactions (discussed in Chapter III).  
However, it is important to understand the inherent differences between reactions and 
attitudes. As discussed, reactions essentially reflect the participants’ satisfaction with the 
training and whether it is perceived as useful. Attitudes gauge the level of acceptance and 
willingness to apply the concepts and skills learned as a result of the training. Adoption 
of training concepts plays a significant role in learning and can have bearing on 
motivation and resulting behavior. Attitudes of trainees have been determined to be 
influenced by personality, culture, delivery of instruction, and dynamics of groups within 
the training (Helmreich & Wilhelm, 1991). The attitudes of Navy and Marine Corps 
aviators are empirically or conceptually related to resource management in the aircraft. 
Helmreich (1984) ascertained that only through modifying attitudes can we substantially 
change observable behavior. Research in the civil aviation industry also has shown that 
attitudes about the management of flight-deck resources are relevant to understanding 
error (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998) and to the quality of crew coordination (Helmreich, 
Foushee, Benson, & Russini, 1986).  
2. CRM Attitude Assessment Tools 
The most popular technique for assessing pilot attitudes towards the concepts 
taught in CRM training is through the use of questionnaires. Most of the previous 
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evaluations of CRM have applied or adapted the already developed Cockpit Management 
Attitudes Questionnaire (CMAQ; Gregorich & Wilhelm, 1993) as well as the Flight 
Management Attitude Questionnaire (FMAQ; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). The feedback 
of the CMAQ comes from self-reported indication of attitudes associated with CRM 
concepts. It incorporates three major scales including ‘communication and coordination’, 
‘command responsibility’, and ‘recognition of stressor effects’. The one factor the 
CMAQ fails to consider is an attitude corresponding to the cognitive aspects such as 
situational awareness, decision making, and workload management (O'Connor et al., 
2008). The CMAQ has 25 different statements describing attitudes drawing from earlier 
NASA research dealing with crew coordination (Helmreich & Wilhelm, 1991). 
Responses to the CMAQ and FMAQ are based on a five-point Likert scale as participants 
are asked to rate their level of agreement for each statement. 
The CMAQ was developed initially to appraise aviator attitudes regarding 
“interpersonal components” of flight crew performance. The questionnaire also is used to 
associate these attitudes to crew behavior (Gregorich, Helmreich, & Wilhelm, 1990). The 
CMAQ is a well-established training evaluation and research tool developed to assess the 
attitudes of flight crew with regards to human factors issues. Not only has the CMAQ 
formed the basis of an attitude assessment for CRM programs in aviation, but has been 
utilized in a number of industries (e.g., nuclear power controllers, aviation maintenance, 
air traffic control, medicine, offshore oil production, and U.S. Navy divers; Flin et al., 
2008). The FMAQ, a subsequent revision of the CMAQ, was developed to examine 
cross-cultural differences in attitudes of flight crews (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). The 
FMAQ included 16 additional items to the CMAQ based on aviators’ values (Seva, 
Gutierrez, Duh, & Chong, 2007) and incorporated Hofstede’s dimensions of national 
culture (Hofstede, 1980).  
Prior studies using the CMAQ questionnaire routinely found a positive shift in 
attitudes of trainees to the concepts taught in CRM programs (Helmreich & Wilhelm, 
1991; Salas, et al., 1999). However, there have been studies that revealed certain types of 
people do not have positive attitude changes (Helmreich & Wilhelm, 1991). These groups 
are commonly referred to as “Boomerangs” or “Cowboys” and are labeled as such 
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because these individuals rejected some of the basic CRM principles. Remedial training 
programs for these individuals were not shown to be a success (Irwin, 1991). 
Nevertheless, the CMAQ remains the most popular measure to assess attitudes and 
provides a useful baseline tool to evaluate attitudes of naval aviators. The advantage of 
basing a questionnaire on the CMAQ is its proven reasonable psychometric 
characteristics. 
3. Attitudinal Hypotheses 
The analysis section of this chapter drew on results of an attitudinal assessment 
based on an adapted version of the CMAQ to evaluate two experimental hypotheses.  The 
first hypothesis addresses potential differences in attitudes of naval aviators trained on 
different aircraft platforms. 
H1: Large wing and rotary wing aviators will be significantly more positive in 
their attitudes to the concepts addressed in CRM training than tactical jet 
aviators.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that tactical jet pilots tend to take CRM training with less 
seriousness than aviators who fly in other platforms. As indicated earlier, this may be 
largely due to the fact many tactical jet pilots are single seat aircraft.  Therefore, many 
might assume CRM training is better applied to aircraft with multi-crew features. As seen 
in previous interviews carried out amongst 36 U.S. Air Force F-16 pilots, more than 85% 
of the pilots had a neutral, mixed, or less than positive attitude to CRM (Karp, Condit, & 
Nullmeyer, 1999).  
A second hypothesis investigates differences in attitudes between aviators based 
on rank. Identical to the reaction analysis in Chapter III, this study categorizes senior 
qualified officers as aviators who fall in the O4 to O6 ranking group and junior officers 
are qualified aviators in the O1 to O3 category who have previously participated in a 
naval CRM training program. 
H2: Junior aviation officers will be significantly more positive in their attitudes 
towards the concepts addressed in CRM training than senior aviation officers. 
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Issues of rank between personnel may play a greater role in the military flight crews, and 
this may be at odds with the concept of assertiveness taught in CRM training (Guzzo & 
Dickson, 1996). This finding was supported in a survey of 272 U.S Navy divers using an 
attitude questionnaire based upon the CMAQ. The study found that junior divers were 
significantly more sensitive to the effect of personal limitations on performance, and 
showed a significantly greater willingness to want to speak up than senior divers 
(O’Connor, 2007). 
B. METHODOLOGY 
1. Instrument and Development 
For the present study, a version of the CMAQ was specifically developed for the 
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps to assess the general attitudes of Naval CRM participants. 
The questionnaire was customized explicitly for naval aviation using familiar terms and 
concepts presented in Naval CRM. A pilot questionnaire was distributed to a group of 20 
experienced naval aviators for their review and feedback. The comments were collected 
and used to develop the Naval Aviator Human Factors (NAHF) questionnaire (see 
Appendix A). Similar to the FMAQ and CMAQ, the NAHF consisted of questions 
associated with aviators’ attitudes towards specific concepts in CRM training. A total of 
37 statements were considered for the development of the NAHF. However, 6 of the 
questions were removed as they did not pertain directly to attitudes towards CRM 
concepts, leaving 31 statements. The 31 statements were then categorized into five 
attitudinal composite subscales:  
 My stress: consisting of 6 items (items 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 14; see Appendix B).  
This scale emphasizes the consideration of- and possible compensation for- 
stressors in oneself (e.g., ‘Even when fatigued I perform effectively during critical 
times in a flight’). 
 Stress of others: consisting of 6 items (items 2, 13, 16, 18, 19, 27).  
This scale emphasizes the consideration of- and possible compensation for- 
stressors in other team members (e.g., ‘Aircrew should mention their stress or 
physical problems to other team members before or during a flight’). 
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 Communication: consisting of 6 items (items 5,1 0,1 1, 17, 23, 32). 
This subscale encompasses communication of intent and plans, delegation of 
tasks and assignment of responsibilities, and the monitoring of crewmembers 
(e.g., ‘The specific roles and responsibilities of aircrew in an emergency are 
identified during the preflight brief’). 
 Command responsibility: consisting of 9 items (items 6, 9, 28, 30, 31, 33, 4, 
35,36).   
Command responsibility includes the notion of appropriate leadership and its 
implications for the delegation of tasks and responsibilities (e.g., ‘The Aircraft 
Commander should take physical control and fly the aircraft in emergency and 
non-standard situations’). 
 Rules and order: consisting of 4 items (items 15, 22, 24, 29). 
This subscale is concerned with adherence to rules and procedures (e.g., ‘Written 
procedures are necessary for all in-flight situations”).  
2. Participants  
The NAHF questionnaire was distributed to a sample of Navy and Marine Corps 
aviators attending training at the Naval Aviation Schools Command in Pensacola, 
Florida. Participation in the study was strictly voluntary. Responses were obtained from a 
total of 364 U.S. Naval aviators.  A total of 134 (37%) of the participants were junior 
officers (01-03) and 230 (63%) were senior level officers (04-06).  Based on reported 
qualifications and experience, each aviator was classified into one of three airframe 
categories including: big wing, tactical jet, and rotary wing (see Table 6 for a breakdown 







Table 6.   Attitudinal Respondent Categorization. 
Respondents  Big Wing  Tactical Jet  Rotary 
Junior officers  43  41  50 
  (11.8%)  (11.3%)  (13.7%) 
Senior officers  60  89  81 
  (16.5%)  (24.5%)  (22.2%) 
Total  103  130  131 
3. Measures 
Data were gathered from participants’ responses to the NAHF attitude 
questionnaire based on their ratings of agreement from the five-point Likert scale ranging 
from A (disagree strongly) to E (agree strongly). Each question based on the 
aforementioned five attitudinal categories was randomly distributed throughout the 
questionnaire. The corresponding responses to the statements were converted to a 
numerical value ranging from 1 to 5 (1 having answered “disagree strongly” to 5 having 
answered “agree strongly”). The participants were broken down by demographics into 
two categories for analysis: experience in the type of aircraft and their positional rank. 
C. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
1. Psychometric Analysis. 
An analysis of the psychometric properties of the NAHF was performed. Each of 
the 31 items was examined, looking at the reliability of the scales used. The skewness, 
kurtosis, and correlation between similar composite subscale statements were determined 
and analyzed. Firstly, the skewness and kurtosis of the individual items were examined. 
A total of nine response items displayed excessive levels of skewness or kurtosis (see 
Appendix B). Seven of the items were related to the subscale of ‘communications’, one 
for ‘stress of others’, and one for ‘rules and order’. Excessive skewness and kurtosis 
indicate the data are not normal. Further investigation needed to be conducted to 
determine the consistency across the separate subscales. 
An assessment was made of the internal reliability of the subscale factors using 
Cronbach’s Alpha. Cronbach’s Alpha is a tool that provides a coefficient of consistency 
with ranges in value from 0 to 1. A higher score corresponds to a more reliable scale. An 
Alpha of 0.7 or greater is typically regarded as the acceptable range for the reliability 
coefficient; however, lower thresholds are seen in the literature (e.g., Gregorich et al., 
1990 reported alpha values of between 0.47 and 0.67 for the CMAQ). Indices resulting in 
lower scores do not necessarily make the findings invalid.  In fact, low alphas may 
indicate the diversity of measured constructs. From Table 7, it can be seen that dropping 
items from both the ‘my stress’ and ‘command responsibility’ sub-scales led to an 
increase in the resulting Alpha levels. However, it was not possible to improve the 
reliability of the ‘rules and order’ sub-scale. Therefore, this sub-scale was dropped from 
further analysis. 









(Scale dropped; 4 items)
0.09 0.52
0.03 0.54
0.001 -  
2. Between Groups Comparison 
A two-way, between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was completed with 
airframe (big wing, tactical jet, and rotary wing) and rank (junior and senior officer) on 
the mean item score for each sub-scale. There were no significant main effects or an 
interaction for the ‘my stress’ subscale. Only the significant effects are reported. For 
‘stress of others’ there was a significant main effect of airframe (F(2,358) = 6.7, p < .05). 
Rotary wing aviators were more sensitive to the stress of others than tactical jet aviators 
(see Figure 5). Further, there was a significant interaction between airframe and rank 
(F(2,358) = 6.7, p<0.05). For fixed wing and helicopter aviators, junior officers were 
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more sensitive to the stress of others than senior officers. The opposite was true for 
tactical jet aviators. For the ‘communication’ subscale there was a significant main effect 
of rank (F(1,358) = 8.7, p<0.05). Senior officers had attitudes indicative of more open 
communication than junior officers (see Figure 6). For ‘command responsibility,’ there 
was a significant main effect of rank (F(1,358) = 15.4, p<0.05), as senior officers had 



















Figure 5.   Mean factor score for ‘Stress of Others’ subscale for CRM attitudinal 

































Figure 6.   Mean factor score for ‘Communications’ subscale for CRM attitudinal 



















Figure 7.   Mean factor score for ‘Command Responsibility’ subscale for CRM 
attitudinal response as indicated on the NAHF questionnaire. 
D. DISCUSSION 
1. Psychometric Properties 
A total of nine items were discarded from the NAHF questionnaire due to 
excessive skewness or kurtosis. Discarding the statements also aided in an attempt to 
obtain acceptable Cronbach’s alphas. Discarding items is a common practice used in 
questionnaire development (DeVellis, 1991). The resulting Cronbach’s Alpha scores of 
the subscales were still relatively low after the nine items were dropped. The evaluation 
of the psychometric properties of the NAHF reported in this thesis is only preliminary. 
The recommendation would be to carry out a confirmatory factor analysis on the NAHF 
to assess the level of fit between the data and the proposed factor structure. 
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2. Between Groups Comparison 
Hypothesis one (large wing and rotary wing aviators will be significantly more 
positive in their attitudes to the concepts addressed in CRM training than tactical jet 
aviators) was generally not supported. The only subscale for which there was a 
significant difference on the basis of airframe was ‘stress of others.’ Rotary wing aviators 
apparently were more sensitive to the stress of other team members than tactical jet 
aviators. These findings may reflect the larger crew and teamwork coordination required 
to fly a military helicopter (two pilots and an enlisted crew chief) versus smaller teams 
seen in tactical jets (either one pilot, or a pilot and navigator, or naval flight officer). 
However, even in a single seat tactical jet, the pilot is very unlikely to be flying without 
at least one wingman (a pilot in another aircraft performing the same mission). Therefore, 
the Navy’s CRM program, as applied in tactical aviation airframes, may benefit from an 
increased emphasis on the effect of the stress of others on performance. 
The most interesting finding, and counter to the second hypothesis (Junior 
aviation officers will have significantly more positive attitudes towards the concepts 
addressed in CRM training than senior aviation officers), was that senior aviators seemed 
to be more supportive than junior aviators of an open cockpit climate as reflected by a 
significantly higher mean item score for the ‘command responsibility’ and 
‘communication’ subscales.  Research shows that high-performing teams have a climate 
of openness and trust, one where team leaders are receptive to alternative views and team 
members are unafraid to express their thoughts (Flin, 1996). The need for assertive 
behavior in junior team members has been sharply highlighted in aviation research (e.g., 
Foushee & Helmreich, 1988). The findings from the NAHF attitude questionnaire 
suggest that senior aviators are receptive to alternate views. However, the junior aviators 
may need to be persuaded that this is truly the case.  
Although counter to what was expected, on reflection, this result may not be a 
complete surprise. The vast majority of the senior individuals who completed the 
questionnaire had been selected to be the Commanding Officer (CO), or Executive 
Officer (XO; second in command) of a squadron. Therefore, fostering a squadron with an 
open culture is within their interest as a leader. Further, many of these senior individuals 
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had come back to aviation after spending a number of years ‘out of the aircraft’ 
performing other jobs. This may have led to a recognition that their flying skills were 
rusty and they would need to rely on the expertise of their junior personnel in the aircraft. 
E. SUMMARY 
The study described in this chapter provides a preliminary analysis of the attitudes 
of naval aviators towards several of the concepts addressed in CRM training. 
Recommendations for further attitudinal analysis should be considered. Additional 
research could be carried out to evaluate the fit of the data to the proposed factor 
structure. However, it is possible to draw two main conclusions from the attitude 
questionnaire analysis. Firstly, it was observed that tactical jet squadrons may benefit 
from training specifically targeted on recognizing, and addressing, the effects of stress in 
other aviators. Secondly, senior aviators appeared more supportive of an open cockpit 
climate than junior aviators. It is suggested that both of these issues should be addressed 
in recurrent CRM training. 
Attitudes of naval aviators towards CRM concepts have repetitively shown to be 
well received and accepted. Yet according to Kirkpatrick (1976), an assessment of 
attitudes of trainees is only one aspect of the second level of a learning evaluation. To 
extend the evaluation of learning, knowledge transformations also must be examined.  
The next chapter discusses a method to analyze the other piece of a learning assessment 
by looking at the knowledge differences between different naval aviators.  
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V. NAVAL AVIATION CRM KNOWLEDGE ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Knowledge Evaluations 
The second component in evaluating effects of learning, beyond evaluating 
attitudinal changes, is to assess the knowledge that was gained as a result of the training. 
According to Kirkpatrick (1996), in order to successfully gauge the amount of knowledge 
acquired, one must devise a method to measure the principles, facts and techniques 
learned from the program. Learning measures should be objective and quantifiable in 
nature and are not necessarily indicative of performance on the job (Goldstein & Ford, 
2002). Performance on the job corresponds to behavioral changes, whereas knowledge 
acquisition addresses aspects of declarative and procedural information retained as a 
result of the training.  
One accepted method used to assess learning is by administering examinations 
such as paper and pencil tests. Evaluating the effects of learning using paper and pencil 
tests is a fairly simple and quick way to estimate knowledge acquisition (Flin et al., 
2008). Tests or exams can denote an increase of the knowledge of a program participant. 
Although exams are popular and a widely used method to assess learning, they also can 
be unintentionally misleading. For example, depending on the design of the test, the 
questions may be too hard (floor effect) or too easy (ceiling effect). Another way to 
evaluate learning of non-technical skills is through the use of vignettes or scenarios. The 
advantages of vignettes are that the measures can be unobtrusive (Kerlinger, 1996), easy 
to replicate, realistic, and interesting to the participant (Gliner, 1997). However, vignettes 
may produce unrealistic responses, become time consuming, and if not designed 
appropriately, difficult to understand (Flin et al., 2008).  Analysis of vignettes can also 
lead to subjectivity and difficulty in quantifying the results.  
2. Previous Knowledge Assessments of CRM 
Despite the large number of studies evaluating CRM training, only a handful of 
studies reported a knowledge assessment. The most common techniques previously used 
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to assess knowledge or skills from CRM training were multiple choice tests (O’Connor et 
al., 2002). A review of the literature indicated increases in knowledge of CRM 
participants as a result of the training.  For example, O’Connor et al. (2008) conducted a 
meta-analysis of CRM evaluations, and found four studies that assessed knowledge gains 
of participants. Of these studies, three examined the effects of CRM training of U.S. 
Naval aviators with respect to knowledge acquired from the Navy’s CRM course. Each of 
these studies used a multiple-choice test as the instrument designed to gauge the amount 
of knowledge change. Three of the four studies suggested participant knowledge of CRM 
concepts was greater after training, as compared to before (O'Connor, Hahn, & Salas, in 
press). In one study of 67 U.S. Naval aircrew personnel, Salas et al. (1999) found that 
knowledge of teamwork principles increased despite a lack of attitudinal changes. The 
aviators who received CRM training had shown higher scores (M = 12.6 out of 17) 
compared to a control group whose scores were slightly lower (M = 9.8 out of 17). 
Although many of these studies provided valuable metrics on CRM knowledge changes, 
all were conducted over a decade ago. 
3. Knowledge Experimental Hypotheses 
H1: Senior naval aviation officers will score significantly higher on a CRM 
knowledge assessment as compared to junior naval aviators. 
Since CRM training is directed to be conducted annually, senior aviators in the 
Navy and Marine Corps have had more exposure to training and experience with regards 
to CRM concepts. Therefore, general concepts addressing crew coordination and safety 
should be more familiar to senior naval aviators as compared to the junior aviators with 
less training and experience.  
H2: There will be a significant difference between aviators based on aircraft 
type (including rotary, TACAIR, and big wing). 
The second hypothesis will determine the effect of airframe on knowledge scores. 
No differences are anticipated, despite CRM being administered uniquely from command 
to command. CRM teaches the same basic principles and non-technical behavioral skills  
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throughout the organization and, therefore, should not have an effect due to airframe. If 
an effect should exist, further research would be warranted to determine inconsistencies 
in CRM instruction. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
1. Instrument and Development 
A ten item multiple-choice exam was developed to assess knowledge acquired 
and retained with regards to concepts taught in the Naval Aviation CRM program. A 
retention test, known as the Knowledge Assessment for Naval Crew Resource 
Management (KANCRM), was developed for this thesis using a popular web-based 
survey assessment tool. Questions for the KANCRM were derived from material taught 
at the five-day Naval CRM instructor course. The questions of the KANCRM included a 
small sample of CRM topics and addressed specific knowledge and skills pertaining to 
human error, workload management, assertiveness, situational awareness, decision 
making, communication, mission analysis, fatigue, and stress effects on performance (see 
Appendix C). A pilot version of the assessment was distributed to non-aviation students 
at the Naval Postgraduate School for review and comment. Participants were asked to 
respond to each question and to indicate their best response by choosing from a list of 
provided answers.  
The KANCRM was screened and approved by the Naval Postgraduate 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). All participants were provided an informed consent 
form, notifying them of their rights and risks as voluntary participants in responding to 
the questionnaire. No compensation was provided to those willing to participate. 
2. Participants 
The KANCRM was distributed to U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aviation officers 
currently attending either the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California or the 
Naval Aviation Safety School in Pensacola, Florida. At the Naval Postgraduate School, 
the KANCRM was delivered a link to the web-based questionnaire via electronic mail to 
101 U.S. Navy and Marine Corps pilots and Naval Flight Officers (NFOs). The response 
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rate of the KANCRM for the Naval Postgraduate School was roughly 70%. In addition, 
the questionnaire was issued to a class of aviation officers attending training at the Naval 
Aviation Safety School in Pensacola. An additional 61 participants completed the 
assessment at the Navy Safety School; however, nine of these responses were redacted as 
they were not currently in the Navy or Marine Corps aviation field. The combination of 
the two samples resulted in responses from 123 naval aviators. 
The participant demographics consisted of a wide range of experience and 
backgrounds. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aviators ranged in rank from O1 to O6 
and had between 6 months and 21 years of flying experience. Navy aviators accounted 
for 67.5% of the total sample, as compared to 32.5% Marine Corps aviators. The 
participants consisted of 118 male and five female fleet aviators. Reported flight hours 
varied from as little as 120 hours to as much as 3,800 hours of flight time. Of the 
respondents, 65% indicated they were pilots and 35% NFOs. The sample represented 
35% TACAIR, 35% rotary, and 27% big wing aviators (3% remained unidentified). 
Participant responses from the KANCRM were collected and analyzed based on the 
answers to the 10 questions and the results are discussed in the following section. 
C. RESULTS 
1. Differences in Rank versus Airframe 
The overall mean correct score of the KANCRM for the sample was found to be 
6.66 out of a possible 10 with a standard deviation of 1.36. Although a significant 
difference between the ranks was not observed, the junior naval aviators scored slightly 
higher (M = 6.71, SD = 1.25) as compared to the senior aviators (M = 6.62, SD = 1.68) as 
seen in Figure 8. Additionally, slight differences, although not found to be significant, 
were observed when mean scores were compared by airframe. Rotary wing aviators 
exhibited the highest mean score (M = 6.79, SD = 1.52) followed by TACAIR aviators 
(M = 6.65, SD = 1.36) and big wing aviators were the lowest (M = 6.49, SD = 1.12).  
However, there was a high degree of variability observed in all sets of aviation groups 






































Figure 8.   Mean KANCRM scores of U.S. Naval aviators by rank (with standard error 

































Figure 9.   Mean KANCRM scores of U.S. Naval aviators by airframe (with standard 
error bars). Scores are reported in number of correct responses out of 10 
questions.  
2. Tests of Between Factors Effects 
Further analysis was conducted to examine the effects between rank and type of 
airframe. A Levene’s test of equality of error in the variances was calculated with no 
significant inconsistencies found (F(5,113) =1.90, p>0.05). In addition, a univariate 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to test the effects of rank and type of 
airframe on CRM participant score. The ANOVA showed no significant difference 
between the groups or interactions (F(5,113) = 1.05, p>0.05). Even though no differences 
in mean scores of naval aviators were found to be statistically significant, senior rotary 
aviator scores were slightly lower than their junior rotary counterparts, while the senior 



































Figure 10.   Comparison of mean KANCRM scores by rank across indicated airframe 
type. Junior officers (O1-O3) are represented by diamonds with a dashed line. 
Senior officer scores are represented with squares and a solid line (reported scores 
in number of correct responses out of 10 questions). 
D. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Hypothesis one (senior naval aviation officers will score significantly higher on a 
CRM knowledge assessment as compared to junior naval aviators) was not supported. 
Mean scores of both junior and senior aviators on the KANCRM were fairly consistent. 
Contrary to expectations, senior aviation officers failed to score significantly higher than 
their junior counterparts. It was assumed senior officers have encountered more 
experience and exposure to concepts addressed in CRM training. One possible 
explanation for the lack of difference could be a result of senior officers having been out 
of the cockpit for quite some time.  Although difficult to ascertain from these findings, 
junior officers may have scored higher than expected if the questions, were in fact, 
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tougher than anticipated. Non-technical skills and behaviors taught in CRM training also 
may be emphasized early in flight program instruction.  
The second hypothesis (there will be a significant difference between aviators 
based on aircraft type) also was not supported, as expected. The results indicated no 
significant differences between mean scores of rotary, big wing, or TACAIR airframes. 
Lack of significance might indicate a consistency in CRM training. Similarity between 
the three types of aircraft could be a result of the large amount of variability seen in the 
scores across all airframes. The limited number of assessment questions also may have 
contributed to the high variability. However, some minor differences were noted and 
raise interesting questions. For example, rotary aviators, to some extent, scored a little 
higher as compared to TACAIR and big wing aviators. And, even though big wing 
aviators had the lowest mean score of the three, this difference could have been attributed 
to the sample (only having 27% big wing aircraft represented compared to 35% 
representation for rotary and TACAIR). The equivalent knowledge assessment scores 
point toward a positive outcome: CRM concepts might be stressed equally across all 
Navy and Marine Corps aviation communities.  
Another interesting result was the overall mean score seen across all participants 
(M = 6.66 out of 10, SD = 1.36).  This average low score could have a variety of 
explanations. The assessment questions may have been poorly designed and included 
awkward wording. This could have resulted in a potential floor effect for certain types of 
questions (either too difficult or ambiguous). Another explanation might be CRM training 
programs are not equally emphasizing certain non-technical concepts. Investigation into 
each question revealed the questions with the lowest mean scores addressed human error 
in mishaps, situational awareness, and errors in decision making. Since there were only 
10 questions with limited topic coverage, a low score is a potential consequence. Further 
studies may want to consider adding additional questions in all CRM concept areas to 
evaluate any differences.  
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E. CONCLUSIONS 
Knowledge assessments of CRM training programs are not routinely conducted. 
In Naval CRM training, tests are not distributed to evaluate participants’ understanding 
and retention of the concepts addressed. Rather, completion of the CRM course fulfills 
the requirements set forth by the Department of the Navy (Chief of Naval Operations, 
2001). Evaluation of training in terms of learning is an imperative part of reviewing 
whether a training program is meeting its intended objective. Gauging whether a training 
program is being culturally accepted by all elements of an organization also is important 
to assess. This section contributed to the validation of the Navy’s CRM program in terms 
of knowledge of CRM concepts between different ranks and communities within naval 
aviation. The results supported the Naval CRM program’s success in terms of similar 
knowledge gained from training across each aviation community. The reactions and 
learning from a training program are only truly observed in the resulting behavior of the 
trainee; however, a in depth analysis of behavior is beyond the scope of this research 
effort. Still, there is one additional level of Kirkpatrick’s (1976) hierarchy of evaluation 
to consider: the training’s impact on the organizational and its results. 
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VI. NAVAL AVIATION CRM RESULTS ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND 
The fourth and final level of Kirkpatrick’s hierarchy of training evaluation is 
analyzing the results or impact on an organization. This is the highest level of evaluation 
as it gauges how effective a program is in meeting the stated desired outcomes in the 
organization. The bottom line is often seen in the results. Many organizations rely heavily 
on this metric to evaluate their training programs. Results can be, in many cases, 
complicated by a variety of factors and extremely difficult to assess (Phillips, 1996). In 
most cases, the challenge arises from identifying the causal relationship between the 
training process and the end product. For example, in aviation it is nearly impossible to 
attribute any one failure as the single source of an accident. Most mishaps are caused by, 
or attributed to, two or more inherent factors. A dynamic interaction exists between 
mechanical, environmental, and human systems and each one has multiple factors that 
have an effect or impact on the others. All the same, consideration must be taken to 
address which factors influence the outcome. Identifying the factors of a mishap is 
accomplished through logical analysis. This section of this thesis is devoted to an 
examination of naval aviation mishap rates over the past decade to understand outcomes 
related to CRM training. 
1. Naval Mishap Classifications 
The Department of the Navy (DON) defines a naval aviation mishap “as an 
unplanned event or series of events, directly involving naval aircraft or UAVs” which 
result in $20,000 or greater cumulative damage to the aircraft or property, or where the 
outcome directly leads to injury of personnel (OPNAVINST 3750.6R, Department of the 
Navy, 2007). Each mishap is rendered a classification based on the severity of the 
mishap. Figure 11 illustrates the Navy’s classification system of aviation mishaps, 
placing them into categories A, B, or C respectively. 
 Figure 11.   DON Naval Aviation mishap classification matrix (From OPNAVINST 
3750.6). 
2. Linking CRM to Mishaps and HFACS Identification 
In U.S. Naval Aviation, the goal of CRM remains the same: to minimize crew 
preventable errors thus improving safety.  Essentially, the better the use of all available 
resources, including people and equipment, the less chance a mishap will occur.  CRM 
concepts focus on the non-technical behavioral skills required for effective team 
communication and coordination between aircrew personnel. Since studies have shown 
that the majority of accidents are related to human factors, CRM became the main 
approach to decrease the number of human related errors. In order to better understand 
the factors involved in an aviation mishap and identify human factors contributions, a 
post-mishap analysis must be performed.  
Once a naval aviation mishap has occurred and is classified, further investigation 
is carried out to determine the casual factors involved.  Answering questions as to what 
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occurred that resulted in the accident is relatively straightforward.  The challenging part 
of causal determination comes when assessing the factors and reasons of why a mishap 
took place and what conditions were present that led to the mishap.  Following Reason’s 
(1990) concept of latent and active failures, a classification system was developed to 
identify explanations of why mishaps occur (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). The product 
resulted in the formation of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System, also 
known as HFACS. The HFACS taxonomy describes four levels of failure: 1) Unsafe 
Acts, 2) Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, 3) Unsafe Supervision, and 4) Organizational 
Influences. Similar to the “Domino Theory” or “Swiss Cheese Model”, the HFACS 
system is based on the premise that casual factors arise from a combination, or series, of 
events or preconditions that lead to an accident. HFACS provides a method to further 
differentiate reasons behind why mishaps occur and is beneficial in linking CRM 
concepts and training to impact of flight safety. 
3. Mishap Rates in Naval Aviation 
Improvements have been made in commercial and military aviation to reduce the 
number of accidents and enhance safety. Naval aviation has been no exception. Numbers 
have shown that over the past fifty years, naval aviation has seen a noticeable reduction 
in the mishap rate from around 55 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours to less than four 
mishaps per 100,000 flight hours (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1996). This progress has been 
attributed to improved aircraft design, maintenance, materials, procedure standardization, 
and other safety programs. Although accident reduction is believed to come from a 
combination of decreased mechanical and environmental factors causes, human error has 
not decreased at nearly the same rate. Where mishaps due to mechanical and 
environmental causes have dropped to insignificant amounts in the past several decades, 
mishaps as a result of human error have only diminished 50% over the same time period 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 1999).  
4. Previous Studies Analyzing Naval Aviation Mishap Rates 
Three noteworthy studies have been conducted looking at the trends in the mishap 
rate for naval aviation. The first study looked at U.S. Naval aviation mishap rates from 
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fiscal year 1977 to 1992. The study distinguished between accidents involving single- 
piloted versus dual-piloted aircraft (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1996). Over the 16-year 
period, the rate of Class A, B, and C aviation mishaps decreased significantly, revealing a 
trend toward safer flight evolutions. However, the rate of decline was not found to be 
equal involving the percentage accidents attributed to mechanical and environmental 
issues as compared to those related to human factors error. In fact, the frequency of 
mishaps accredited to mechanical or environmental problems had dropped to 
insignificant amounts as early as the mid 1990s.  Conversely, the frequency of naval 
aviation mishaps due to human error over the same time frame only fell by about 50%.  
A similar trend was determined to exist in both single- and dual-piloted aircraft. 
The ratio of human related error to mechanical/environmental causes in 1977 was 
roughly 1 to 1, whereas in 1992 the ratio increased to approximately 9 to 1 for single-
piloted aircraft and 12 to 1 for multi-crew aircraft (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1996). This is 
a significant increase in the proportion of mechanical/environmental to human attributed 
mishaps. Shappell and Wiegmann (1996) concluded the study by recommending a more 
focused effort to reduce the rate of mishaps in naval aviation despite the implementation 
of CRM related training programs. 
A second major naval aviation mishap study reviewed mishap trends and causal 
factors over a four year period from 1986 to 1990 (Yacavone, 1993). This study included 
only Naval Class A mishaps in its final evaluation. Yacavone (1993) found that 59% of 
Navy and Marine Corps Class A aviation mishaps were attributed, in part, to aircrew 
human factors. Further analysis revealed that 45% of all naval aviation mishaps were 
accredited to “lack of aircrew coordination,” the most common human factor causal error. 
These findings further sparked the Navy’s interest in developing a standardized Aircrew 
Coordination Training (ACT) program that ultimately grew into the current Naval CRM 
program of today.  
A follow on study was conducted in 1999 by Wiegmann and Shappell that 
investigated naval aviation mishaps from 1990 to 1996.  This study examined both rotary 
and tactical jet (TACAIR) Class A naval mishaps over the six-year period to assess the 
role of human error and crew resource management failures. The results revealed that 
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over 75% of the mishaps were attributed to human error and that 56% involved at least 
one failure related to CRM concepts (Wiegmann & Shappell, 1999). TACAIR mishap 
rates during this period were higher than those of rotary wing mishap rates. TACAIR 
mishap rates across the seven-year time frame were found to be approximately 4.38 
mishaps per 100,000 flight hours as compared to the 2.98 mishaps per 100,000 flight 
hours for rotary aircrews. The authors noted that TACAIR operations are conventionally 
more hazardous and include more aggressive maneuvers than those of rotary aircraft. 
Despite the fact failures due to human error were fairly consistent across both airframes, 
rotary wing aircrew mishaps had a higher percentage associated with CRM failures than 
TACAIR (80.43% compared to 46.49%). Although the overall mishap rates remained 
relatively low during this time period, CRM failures continued to be a major causal factor 
involved. Since this was the most recent study of CRM’s effect on naval aviation mishap 
rate, this thesis continued to build upon this research by evaluating Class A mishaps in 
naval aviation to examine the effects of CRM training in terms of the impact on the 
organization over the past decade. 
5. Results Hypothesis 
Wiegmann and Shappell’s (1999) findings illustrated naval aviation’s consistent 
mishap rate across fiscal year’s 1990 to 1996. During those years, CRM became more 
widely accepted in both TACAIR and rotary wing communities. The impact of CRM 
training on the Navy as an organization was analyzed using mishap data obtained from 
the Naval Safety Center to investigate the following hypothesis: 
Crew Resource Management training has had a positive effect on the U.S. Navy 




In this study, an examination was conducted of Naval Aviation Class A mishap 
reports (from 1997 until 2007) obtained from the Naval Safety Center. This evaluation 
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considered the mishap rate in terms of both individual and aircrew error as indicated by 
the data. The mishap data was separated in terms of error associated with CRM and non-
CRM failures that were identified as causal to the mishap.  This assessment seeks to 
determine what fraction is likely resulting from CRM training and if CRM has had a 
positive effect on mishap rates over the past decade.   
2. Safety Mishap Data 1997-2007 
Naval aviation mishap data from fiscal year 1997 to 2007 was separated into three 
categories based on type of aircraft. The three categories included rotary, TACAIR, and a 
third category for the V-22 Osprey (a tiltrotor aircraft used in the Marine Corps and Air 
Force). The data did not include mishap data for large, fixed wing aircraft. Due to the V-
22 being a newly introduced aircraft within the time frame being analyzed, as well as the 
high mishap rate during its evaluation period, these data were excluded from the analysis. 
Discarding the V-22 mishap data left two remaining airframes for comparison: rotary 
wing and TACAIR aircraft. The data included the number of mishaps attributed to human 
error as well as those attributed to at least one CRM-type failure. Each fiscal year 
included the corresponding number of flight hours for each airframe allowing for the 
determination of the yearly mishap rate. The results were analyzed and are discussed in 
the following section.   
C. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
1. Overall Naval Aviation Mishap Frequencies and Rates 
Over fiscal years 1997 through 2007, a total of 238 naval aviation mishaps were 
recorded (divided into 140 TACAIR and 98 rotary wing aircraft). The total documented 
flight time for both airframes was 8,363,663 hours. The distribution of flight hours was 
fairly consistent with 4,019,045 TACAIR flight hours and 4,344,618 flight hours in 
rotary aircraft. This resulted in a combined flight mishap rate across the time period of 
2.85 mishaps per 100,000 hours of flight operations. Over the 11-year span, the TACAIR 
community had a slightly higher mishap rate of 3.48 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours as 
compared to 2.26 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours for rotary wing aircraft (see Figure 
12). The peak mishap rate for TACAIR was reported in fiscal year 2003 with a rate of 
5.15 and the lowest was 2.25 in 2007. For rotary wing aircraft, the maximum mishap rate 






























Figure 12.   Mishap rates for TACAIR (solid line) and rotary wing (dashed line) aircraft 
across fiscal years 1997-2007.  
2. Mishaps Related to Human-Error 
Of the 238 mishaps in naval aviation from fiscal year 1997 to 2007, 90.3% were 
attributed to some form of human error. The relative percent of mishaps for both the 
TACAIR and rotary wing communities were comparatively equal. The TACAIR data 
shows that 90.7% of the 140 mishaps were attributed, at least in part, to human error; 
whereas rotary wing aircraft had 89.8% of the 98 mishaps ascribed to human error (see 























Figure 13.   Percent of mishaps (for TACAIR and rotary wing aircraft) involving human 
error. The solid line indicates the average mishap percentage for both airframes. 
3. Mishaps Due to CRM Failures 
A total of 68.9% of the 238 mishaps were determined to have involved at least 
one form of CRM failure that was determined to have had a causal factor in the mishap. 
The TACAIR community showed that 62.9% of its mishaps were related to CRM 
failure(s). Rotary wing aircraft percentages were, generally, higher than TACAIR at an 










































Figure 14.   Percent of mishaps (for TACAIR and rotary wing aircraft) involving at least 
one form of CRM failure. The solid line indicates the average mishap percentage 


















































Figure 15.   Mishap rates for TACAIR from fiscal year 1997 to 2007. The overall 
TACAIR mishap rate is indicated by triangles with a dashed line. Mishap rates 
involving some form of human error are represented by diamonds with a 
dashed/dotted line. Mishap rates attributed to at least one CRM failure are 































Figure 16.   Mishap rates for rotary wing aircraft from fiscal year 1997 to 2007. The 
overall Rotary wing mishap rate is indicated by triangles with a dashed line. 
Mishap rates involving some form of human error are represented by diamonds 
with a dashed/dotted line. Mishap rates attributed to at least one CRM failure are 
represented by squares with a solid line.  
D. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Class A mishap rates in naval aviation have remained at lower levels despite the 
assorted fluctuations seen in the safety data from fiscal year 1997 to 2007. Even over the 
past decade, the average mishap rate is slightly lower (2.85 per 100,000 flight hours) as 
compared to the mishap rate (3.84 per 100,000 flight hours) found by Wiegmann and 
Shappell (1999) in their study from 1990 to 1996. In addition, both TACAIR and rotary 
wing aircraft average mishap rates have faintly decreased compared to the prior study. 
TACAIR had dropped from an average rate of 4.38 in 1990-96 to 3.48 across 1997-2007.  
Similarly, rotary wing aircraft decreased from 2.98 to 2.26 over the same time frame. 
TACAIR continues to exhibit a higher mishap rate than rotary wing aircraft as was 
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observed in Wiegmann and Shappell’s (1999) review. Considerations of tactical jet 
versus rotary wing aircraft mission sets were ascribed as the reasons for this difference in 
earlier research (Wiegmann & Shappell, 1999). The hazardous nature of TACAIR 
maneuvers and training could account for these differences. Finally, consideration must 
be given to the operational tempo seen as a result of wartime evolutions over the time 
frame examined in this study. This may be a positive indication that with more mission 
flights vice training flights, the mishap rate has remained fairly constant. 
Despite a minimal decrease in overall mishap rates in naval aviation from the 
early 1990s to the early twenty-first century, the percent of mishaps attributed to human 
error has not followed suit. Human error accounted for nearly 78% of naval aviation 
mishaps as compared to 90% seen over the past decade. This obvious increase in human 
error related mishap percentages suggest human factor issues continue to present 
problems in naval aviation. However, the increase in percentage related to human error 
could be a result of acceptance and awareness of the contribution of human error in 
aviation. As the organization becomes more attentive to potential human-related errors 
during operations, these causal factors are more readily identifiable. Another explanation 
for the increase in percentage may be that mishap rates due to mechanical or 
environmental reasons have significantly decreased to insignificant levels, perhaps due to 
technological advances and safety prevention programs. This trend would result in a 
larger percentage of mishaps caused by a human-related failure.  
The average percent of aviation mishaps over the past several years involving at 
least one occurrence of failure in CRM is approaching 70%. These results fail to provide 
sufficient support for the proposed hypothesis that CRM has had a positive impact on the 
mishap rate over the past decade. Wiegmann and Shappell (1999) also found that 56% of 
all aircrew-related mishaps involved a failure of CRM. Similarly, rotary wing aircraft 
mishaps associated with CRM failures were consistently higher than TACAIR mishaps 
(77.6% versus 62.9%). This disparity was not as sizeable as found in previous research 
which found a difference of 33.9% higher percentage of rotary wing aircraft. Rotary wing 
percentages have decreased while TACAIR percentages have increased. Again, CRM 
concepts and awareness may result in a larger percentage of TACAIR mishaps being 
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coded as CRM-related. As for the higher rotary wing percentage of mishaps due to CRM 
failures, helicopter crews are traditionally larger and often more complex than seen in 
TACAIR aircraft. The mishaps which occur in routine operations of rotary airframes are 
likely to have a high probability of being crew-related. Compared to the results found in 
the early 1990s, the percentage has dropped, but remains higher than desired. 
E. SUMMARY 
CRM failures continue to plague naval aviation and contribute to a high 
percentage of mishaps. However, mishap rates in naval aviation have decreased slightly 
over the past decade, but not to insignificant levels ascribed to mechanical and 
environmental factors. It may be true that human error is unavoidable and can never be 
eliminated as long as humans play an integral role in aviation systems. CRM programs 
seek to reduce the number of mishaps attributed to poor crew communication and 
coordination. As seen from this and previous CRM research, assessing the direct impact 
of training on aviation mishaps and safety is difficult. CRM might be the key component 
in maintaining low mishap rates in naval aviation, despite the large percentage of mishaps 
attributed to human error. There may not be much left to attribute as a cause of the 
mishap. CRM has, most likely, helped in avoiding several accidents saving money and 
lives. However, it is nearly impossible to account for the success rate in terms of mishap 
prevention associated with CRM training. 
Nevertheless, examining the effectiveness of training in terms of its impact on the 
organization is important. Although no direct conclusions can be made regarding the 
success of CRM in terms of deterrence of aviation mishaps, this study provided valuable 
and updated information regarding naval aviation mishap rates over the past decade.  
Evaluating a program in terms of results alone is clearly not sufficient (Kirkpatrick, 
1996). This is the primary reason this research effort attempted to look at the value of 
naval CRM training across different levels of Kirkpatrick’s (1976) hierarchy including 
the reactions, learning (attitudes and knowledge), and organizational impact. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis applied a multi-faceted evaluation technique to provide an objective 
measure of the effectiveness of the Navy and Marine Corps CRM program. Using 
Kirkpatrick’s (1976) hierarchy, four studies pertaining to the reactions, attitudes, 
knowledge, and outcomes of Naval CRM were examined. Reactions of naval aviators 
were found to be generally favorable toward the utility of CRM concepts taught in each 
aviation command. No specific trends were found other than a slightly positive increase 
in aviator reaction responses following fiscal years 2002 and 2003. Positive reactions hint 
at the success of CRM instruction and delivery methods throughout the Navy and Marine 
Corps. Favorable reactions were consistent with prior CRM research indicating a 
continued acquiescence for the training. While trainee satisfaction does not ensure 
effective training has occurred, contentment in the program suggests learners may be 
more motivated to participate and acknowledge the value of instruction.  
Learning in the Naval CRM program was also examined through both an 
attitudinal and knowledge-based assessment. No differences were found between aviators 
in their attitudes toward general concepts addressed in CRM training. Adjustments to the 
delivery method and instruction of techniques addressing specific CRM concepts warrant 
further consideration. For example, increasing awareness of other crewmembers’ stress 
levels for tactical jet aviators deserves contemplation for future CRM development. The 
responses to the NAHF attitude questionnaire suggest senior aviators tend to be more 
receptive, than expected, to subordinates expressing a difference in opinion. In CRM 
training, emphasizing the fact senior officers indicated their willingness to listen to junior 
aviators who may be reluctant to speak up in CRM training could prove beneficial. 
Because this research relied upon a modified version of the CMAQ to assess naval 
aviator attitudes, CRM concepts heavily rooted in cognitive processes were not 
addressed. Therefore, the NAHF questionnaire could be supplemented by additional 
research methods to investigate the posture of CRM concepts related to decision making, 
situational awareness, and workload management (O'Connor et al., 2008). 
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A knowledge assessment of Naval CRM (KANCRM) found no significant 
differences between aviators based upon rank or airframe. This finding may suggest 
CRM training, despite the variation in instruction from command to command, is fairly 
consistent in emphasizing the non-technical concepts within the program. However, the 
observed low mean knowledge scores may be a warning sign that certain concepts are not 
being addressed adequately in the program. Knowledge assessments are too often 
excluded from CRM effectiveness evaluations. The KANCRM, although limited in 
scope, provides a cursory assessment technique to help quantity a fraction of the learning 
as a result of CRM training. Expansion of the assessment might present additional 
metrics to further investigate how well specific CRM concepts are retained. Furthermore, 
routinely administering a knowledge evaluation may be considered. 
The third level of assessment, behaviors, was omitted from this study due to 
limited time, feasibility and resources.  However, it is important to take into consideration 
the impact a training program may have on behaviors. Behavioral changes are key 
indicators in identifying whether knowledge acquired in training truly transfers to 
improved or altered behaviors on the job. Evaluation of behaviors can be witnessed 
through observational studies as well as simulated environments. Several previous studies 
evaluating behavior changes have suggested CRM successfully changes trainee behaviors 
(O’Connor et al., 2002; Salas et al., 2001) while other studies provided arguments of 
unconvincing behavioral changes (Salas et al., 2006). More research is recommended to 
study the effects of learning on behavioral changes in the Naval CRM program.   
Ultimately the vitality of any training program relies on a combination of 
favorable reactions, increased learning, and effective behavioral changes. But often the 
measure of a program’s outcome will compel an organization to implement or continue to 
fund the training. This is the reason most training evaluations only estimate the return on 
investment in terms of bottom line results. Safety and mission accomplishment remain 
the top priorities in naval aviation. An examination of naval aviation was performed 
using safety data from fiscal years 1997 through 2007 and found that mishap rates have 
remained relatively constant (under five mishaps per 100,000 flight hours). These mishap 
rates are similar to what has been observed since CRM was first applied in naval aviation 
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in the early 1990s (Yacavone, 1993; Wiegmann & Shappell, 1999). The direct impact 
CRM training has on mishap rates and preventing incidents remains unclear. On the other 
hand, mishaps are infused with human factors issues. CRM may be the chief contributing 
factor that already keeps mishap rates at such low levels, and the remaining percent of 
mishaps cannot be eliminated as human error will always exist.  
B. CRM HSI CONSIDERATIONS  
Crew interaction, pilot experience, flow of information, team cognition, and 
fatigue are all aspects of human factors that need to be further explored in aviation to 
maximize safety and performance. From a Human Systems Integration (HSI) perspective, 
CRM concepts are intended to coordinate all available resources of a system, from both 
human and machine, to ensure the goal of improving performance and safety is 
accomplished.  Today’s aviators are required to interact routinely with computerized 
systems increasing the workload and synchronization complexity of managing both the 
crew and machine. HSI and human performance considerations multiply and become 
more significant as the equipment used by high reliability organizations becomes more 
sophisticated and complex. 
The research in this thesis described several interdisciplinary tradeoffs between 
cognitive processing, team coordination, and personnel safety seen in U.S. Navy and 
Marine Corps aviation. Techniques taught in CRM training must be considered in the 
design of a system, and especially in a system of systems. Maurino (1999) suggests 
“effective CRM training requires dropping the piecemeal strategies largely favored in the 
past in favor of a system approach, because implementing CRM does not simply mean 
training pilots, controllers, and mechanics, but developing the organization” (p. 230). 
Manpower, personnel, training and education (MPT&E) are critical inputs required to 
infuse CRM concepts into routine flight operations. Employing sound human factors 
engineering principles into aviation system acquisitions will reinforce good CRM 
practices. Incorporating HSI into the future of aircraft design and CRM development is 
necessary to make the most of the Navy and Marine Corps human capital. In fact, the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) now mandates that program managers of new 
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military systems must consider HSI in the design process. “The Program Manager shall 
have a plan for HSI in place early in the acquisition process to optimize total system 
performance, minimize total ownership costs, and ensure that the system is built to 
accommodate the characteristics of the user population that will operate, maintain, and 
support the system” (Department of Defense, 2008, p. 60).   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Technological advances continue to attempt to improve reliability and safety in 
aviation. Design considerations throughout the acquisition process must also continue to 
expound on integrating humans, including our cognitive and physiological capabilities, as 
fundamental aspects of aviation systems. Nevertheless, CRM training continues to be the 
primary method in mitigating the number of mishaps due to human crew coordination 
error in aviation. The program must go beyond simple training requirements and become 
more in grained into the culture. Perhaps the evidence found in this study suggests a 
transformation of cultural acceptance is gradually occurring.  
Issues mentioned in this thesis suggest supplementary research and evaluation of 
the Navy’s CRM program be considered. Specifically, it is important to gather additional 
metrics on the reactions, learning, behavior and outcomes as a result of naval CRM 
training. Collecting CRM feedback could easily be accomplished through a routine and 
standardized evaluation. Establishing a CRM baseline assessment, using non-aviation 
participants, could provide added benefit in understanding the effectiveness of the 
training. Data collected from research can then be analyzed in longitudinal studies to 
assess the impact of CRM on human factor behaviors. It is also recommended for naval 
aviation to consider developing or modifying specific training objectives for each type of 
airframe. Designing training that meets the idiosyncrasies of TACAIR, rotary wing, and 
other fixed wing aircraft might increase the usefulness of the training. Accomplishing this 
task may require separate evaluations of the CRM course material for each airframe 
within a command. 
CRM programs have begun to extend beyond aviation into other high reliability 
organizations (Flin, O’Connor, & Mearns, 2002). Lessons and assessments from other 
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CRM programs can be applied to make improvements to the Navy and Marine Corps 
aviation program. Additionally, results from multi-level evaluations, as seen here, may 
aid in designing, implementing, or assessing future CRM team coordination training. The 
future of CRM in U.S. Naval Aviation must be considered. Making CRM an adaptive and 
responsive training program allows training to be tailored to the ever-changing operating 
environment. Rather than waiting years or decades to analyze outcomes of CRM training, 
regular evaluations provide critical information and feedback to quickly revise 
curriculum to meet mission requirements. The U.S. Army’s Aircrew Training 
Coordination – Enhanced (ACT-E) is an example of a program that seeks to continuously 
adapt to changes in aviation requirements.    
 Finally, as aviation technology matures and the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAV) becomes ubiquitous, CRM training also must adapt its concepts to account for 
such changes. Additional research in human and automated machine interaction play a 
vital role in future CRM concept development, identifying needed capabilities and non-
technical skills required for autonomous aviation operators. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Extensive funding devoted to improving safety, both through procedures and 
technology advances in aviation, have greatly reduced the mishap rate over the past 
several decades. However, one fact remains: human error is a principal contributor 
toward mishaps in naval aviation. CRM training remains a fundamental technique used to 
ensure effective team coordination in aviation with the goal to minimize preventable 
accidents. Therefore, it is important to continue to assess whether CRM is meeting its 
goal in the Navy of “improving mission effectiveness by minimizing crew preventable 
errors, maximizing crew coordination, and optimizing risk management” (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2001).  
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APPENDIX A. NAHF QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please answer the following items by using the following scale in writing your response 
beside each item: 
 





Neutral Agree Slightly Agree Strongly 
 
____1.   Even when fatigued, I perform effectively during critical times in a flight. 
____2.   I let other members of the aircrew know when my workload is becoming (or is 
about to become) excessive. 
____3.   My decision-making ability is as good in emergencies as in routine flying 
operations. 
____4.   I am more likely to make judgment errors in an emergency. 
____5.   A debriefing after each flight is an important part of developing and maintaining 
effective teamworking. 
____6.  In abnormal situations, I rely on my superiors to tell me what to do. 
____7.   I am less effective when stressed or fatigued. 
____8.  My performance is not adversely affected by working with an inexperienced or   
 less capable member of the aircrew. 
____9.  Successful flightdeck management is primarily a function of the Aircraft 
Commander’s flying proficiency. 
____10.  If I perceive a problem with the flight, I will speak up, regardless of who might 
be affected. 
____11.  The pre-flight brief is important for safety and effective teamworking. 
____12.  Human factors councils are regarded as non-punitive in my squadron. 
____13.  Aircrew should monitor each other for signs of stress or fatigue. 
____14.  Personal problems can adversely affect my performance. 
____15.  Truly professional aircrew can leave personal problems behind when flying. 
____16.  Aircrew should mention their stress or physical problems to other team 
members before or during a flight. 
____17.  Good communication and crew coordination are as important as technical 
proficiency for flight safety. 
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Neutral Agree Slightly Agree Strongly 
 
____18.   Effective crew coordination requires aircrew to consider the personal work 
styles of other team members 
____19.  Aircrew should alert others to their actual, or potential, work overload. 
____20.  A true professional does not make mistakes. 
____21.  Human factors boards are regarded as non-punitive in my squadron. 
____22.  NATOPS procedures are always followed in my squadron. 
____23.  The specific roles and responsibilities of aircrew in an emergency are identified 
during the preflight brief. 
____24.  Written procedures are necessary for all in-flight situations. 
____25.  Uncertain situations often require quick decision making.  
____26.  If the human factors council is about to discuss one of the council members, 
then that individual always leaves the room. 
____27.  Aircrew should be aware of, and sensitive to, the personal problems of other 
team members. 
____28.  Junior aircrew should not question the Aircraft Commander’s decisions in 
emergencies.  
____29.  It is better to agree with other crew members than to voice a different opinion. 
____30.  Aircraft Commanders who encourage suggestions from aircrew are weak 
leaders. 
____31.  The Aircraft Commander should take physical control and fly the aircraft in 
emergency and non-standard situations. 
____32.  The pilot flying the aircraft should verbalize plans for procedures or maneuvers 
and should be sure that the information is understood and acknowledged by other 
crew members. 
____33.  Aircrew should not question actions of the Aircraft Commander, except when 
they threaten the safety of the flight. 
____34.  Crew members share responsibility for prioritizing activities in high workload 
situations. 
____35.  There are no circumstances (except total incapacitation) where the co-pilot 
should assume command of the aircraft.  
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____36.  Junior aircrew should not question the Aircraft Commander’s decisions during 
normal operations 
____37.  How frequently in your squadron are junior personnel afraid to express 
disagreement with more senior personnel (please circle below)? 
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APPENDIX B. ANALYSIS OF THE NAHF QUESTIONNAIRE  
Skewness and Kurtosis of the NAHF: 
NAHF analysis
  N Skewness Std. Error of Skewness Kurtosis Std. Error of Kurtosis
  Valid Missing
My stress 1Fatigued effective ® 410 ‐0.37 0.12 ‐3.06 ‐1.02 0.24 ‐3.1 ‐4.2 1
Others stress 2Let others know workload 410 ‐0.84 0.12 ‐6.96 0.00 0.24 ‐7.0 0.0 1
My stress 3decision emergency routine ® 411 ‐0.46 0.12 ‐3.82 ‐0.90 0.24 ‐3.8 ‐3.7 0
My stress 4Judgement errors emergency 410 ‐0.15 0.12 ‐1.28 ‐1.14 0.24 ‐1.3 ‐4.8 1
Comms 5Debrief is important 411 -3.63 0.12 ‐30.15 14.95 0.24 -30.1 62.2 0
Command 6Abnormal, rely on superiors 411 0.68 0.12 5.66 ‐0.49 0.24 5.7 ‐2.0 0
My stress 7Less effective stressed fatigued 410 ‐0.80 0.12 ‐6.63 ‐0.27 0.24 ‐6.6 ‐1.1 1
My stress 8Performance not affected by inexperience 410 0.22 0.12 1.86 ‐1.19 0.24 1.9 ‐5.0 1
Command 9Successful flightdeck AC proficiency ® 402 0.10 0.12 0.78 ‐1.10 0.24 0.8 ‐4.5 9
Comms 10If perceive problem speak up 411 -2.81 0.12 ‐23.36 9.30 0.24 -23.4 38.7 0
Comms 11Pre-flight important 411 -6.08 0.12 ‐50.48 43.73 0.24 -50.5 182.0 0
12HF councils nonpunitive 404 ‐1.11 0.12 ‐9.17 0.39 0.24 ‐9.2 1.6 7
Others stress 13Airecrew should monitor 411 -2.94 0.12 ‐24.41 10.09 0.24 -24.4 42.0 0
My stress 14Personal problems affect performance 411 ‐0.96 0.12 ‐7.94 0.15 0.24 ‐7.9 0.6 0
Rules 15Truly professional behind ® 411 ‐0.27 0.12 ‐2.23 ‐1.14 0.24 -2.2 -4.8 0
Others stress 16Airecrew mention stress fatigue 407 ‐1.48 0.12 ‐12.25 2.58 0.24 ‐12.3 10.7 4
Comms 17Good comms important as technical 411 -3.49 0.12 ‐29.02 15.55 0.24 -29.0 64.7 0
Others stress 18Effective coordination personal work styles 411 ‐1.60 0.12 ‐13.29 3.16 0.24 ‐13.3 13.2 0
Others stress 19Alert others to mistakes 411 ‐1.68 0.12 ‐13.98 5.25 0.24 -14.0 21.9 0
20True professional no mistakes 411 3.63 0.12 30.16 14.31 0.24 30.2 59.6 0
21HF boards nonpunitive 402 0.00 0.12 0.02 ‐0.85 0.24 0.0 -3.5 9
Rules 22NATOPS followed 409 ‐0.68 0.12 ‐5.65 ‐0.50 0.24 -5.6 -2.1 2
Comms 23Roles and respons emergencies id 411 ‐1.58 0.12 ‐13.13 2.97 0.24 ‐13.1 12.4 0
Rules 24Written procedures 411 0.83 0.12 6.92 ‐0.31 0.24 6.9 ‐1.3 0
25Uncertain situations quick 411 ‐0.81 0.12 ‐6.75 ‐0.44 0.24 ‐6.8 ‐1.8 0
26HF council, then leave 400 ‐0.71 0.12 ‐5.86 ‐0.64 0.24 ‐5.9 ‐2.6 11
Others stress 27Aircrew aware and sensitive 411 ‐1.03 0.12 ‐8.55 1.01 0.24 ‐8.5 4.2 0
Command 28Junior not question in emergency 400 1.81 0.12 14.85 3.61 0.24 14.8 14.8 11
Rules 29Better to agree 400 2.66 0.12 21.78 7.64 0.24 21.8 31.4 11
Command 30AC suggestions are weak ® 400 4.80 0.12 39.38 25.37 0.24 39.4 104.2 11
Command 31AC control in emergency 389 0.32 0.12 2.60 ‐0.82 0.25 2.6 -3.3 22
Comms 32Pilot flying verbalize 399 -2.44 0.12 ‐19.93 6.89 0.24 -19.9 28.3 12
Command 33Aircrew not question AC 399 1.22 0.12 9.98 0.88 0.24 10.0 3.6 12
Command 34Crew members responsible for priority 398 -2.06 0.12 ‐16.86 4.32 0.24 -16.9 17.7 13
Command 35No circumstances when co‐pilot 389 1.23 0.12 9.97 0.51 0.25 10.0 2.1 22
Command 36Junior question during normal 399 1.36 0.12 11.15 1.55 0.24 11.2 6.4 12
37Junior disagree 402 0.01 0.12 0.04 ‐0.06 0.24 0.0 -0.2 9
Count Subscale Items Alpha (before) Dropped Alpha (after)
6 My stress 1,3 ,4,7,8,14 0.09 3,4,7,14 0.52
6 Stress of others 2,13,16,18,19,27, 0.57 0.57
6 Comms 5,10,11,17,23,32 0.51 0.51
9 Command 6,9 ,28,30 ,31,33,34,35,36 0.03 6,28,31,33,35,36 0.54
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